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More than fifty years ago, Congress enacted a prohibition againstpolitical
campaign interventionfor all charities, including churches and other houses of
worship, as a condition for receiving tax-deductible contributions. Yet the
Internal Revenue Service has never taken a house of worship to court for
alleged violation of the prohibitionthrough political comments from the pulpit,
presumably at least in part because of concerns about the constitutionality of
doing so. This decision is surprising, because a careful review of Free
Exercise Clause case law - both before and after the landmark Employment
Division v. Smith decision - reveals that the prohibition almost certainly
would have survived a constitutionalchallenge.
Now, however, two changes to the relevant legal landscape may shift the
balance toward houses of worship seeking to challenge the prohibition in the
sermon context and generate new concernsfor thefederal government, even as
the IRS begins more aggressively to investigate alleged violations. The first
change is Congress's enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 ("RFRA"), which codified the rarely followed substantial burden/strict
scrutiny analysis articulatedby the Supreme Court in pre-Smith Free Exercise
Clause cases. While no longer applicable to state and local laws, RFRA still
applies to federal laws, including the prohibition. The second change is the
growing support among both courts and scholarsfor an institutionalapproach
to protecting constitutional rights, particularly in the context of religious
organizations. This approach suggests that houses of worship challenging the
prohibition may be able to argue successfully that the ability to speak to their
members about matters of religious conviction is a necessary aspect of free
exercise and so the government cannot, either constitutionally or under RFRA,
discourage such speech by placing a condition on the receipt of a longstanding tax benefit.

INTRODUCTION

Over fifty years ago, Congress prohibited charities from intervening in
political campaigns.' The federal government's long-standing interpretation of
See infra Part I and note 24. For the limited information that is known about thenSenator Lyndon Johnson's reasons for seeking the prohibition's enactment, see infra notes
29-31 and accompanying text.

2009]

POLITICS AT THE PULPIT

1139

this prohibition is that it bars charities from supporting or opposing candidates
for elected public office, and that the charities reached by the prohibition
include churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, and other houses of
worship. 2 Yet since its enactment, there has not been a single court case
addressing the significant constitutional and statutory issues raised by the
application of the prohibition to religious leaders speaking to their
congregations. Instead, the only court decisions concerning the prohibition's
application to churches or religious ministries involve communications with
the public about candidates. 3 The courts will almost certainly have to break
their silence on this issue in the near future, because substantially increased
enforcement of the prohibition has resulted in increasingly defiant houses of
worship and offers from legal groups to defend them.
For example, on October 31, 2004 the Rector Emeritus of All Saints Church
in Pasadena, California delivered a sermon titled "If Jesus Debated Senator
Kerry and President Bush" 4 that spurred an Internal Revenue Service
investigation. 5 The church waged a highly public battle with the IRS that
resulted in the IRS concluding that the sermon violated the prohibition but
imposing no penalty, leading the church to demand an explanation and an
apology. 6 On January 16, 2008, Pastor Kenneth D. Taylor of the Calvary
Assembly of God in Algoma, Wisconsin advertised an open letter to the IRS in
the Wall Street Journalreferencing a sermon he delivered in 2006, stating "[i]f
you didn't like the All Saints sermon, you would have hated mine!," and
challenging the IRS to investigate his church. 7 Another example of the
For more details regarding how the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue
Service have interpreted the prohibition, see infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
3 See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (applying the
prohibition to a church's purchase of full-page newspaper ads critical of then-candidate Bill
Clinton); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 851-53 (10th
Cir. 1972) (upholding tax-exempt revocation where religious ministry's radio broadcasts
and other public communications discussed candidates).
4 George F. Regas, Rector Emeritus, All Saints Church, If Jesus Debated Senator Kerry
and President Bush (Oct. 31, 2004), http://aschu.convio.net/archives/sermons/(10-3104)%20If%2OJesus%2ODebated.pdf.
I Press Release, All Saints Church, All Saints Church, Pasadena Demands Correction
and Apology from the IRS (Sept. 23, 2007), http://www.allsaints-pas.org/site/DocServer/
IRSPressReleaseSept_23 2007.pdf?doclD=2521; Letter from Marsha A. Ramirez,
Dir., EO Examinations, Dep't of the Treasury, to All Saints Church (Sept. 10, 2007),
http://www.allsaints-pas.org/site/DocServer/Letter-from IRS-toAllSaintsChurch.pdf?
doclD=2541 [hereinafter Letter from Ramirez to All Saints Church].
6 See Press Release, All Saints Church, supra note 5; Letter from Ramirez to All Saints
Church, supra note 5.
7 Kenneth D. Taylor, Calvary Assembly of God, An Open Letter to the IRS About
Preaching from the Pulpit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2008, at B18, available at
http://www.becketfund.org/files/OpenLettertoIRSfrom-Calvary and BecketFund.pdf.
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty paid for the publication of the letter. Id.
2
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growing attention to the prohibition is one of the first mainstream media
articles on Reverend Jeremiah Wright that focused on whether his support of
then-Senator Barack Obama violated the tax law prohibition on
electioneering. 8 Finally, a conservative religious freedom group, the Alliance
Defense Fund, recruited over thirty pastors to preach on Sunday, September
28, 2008 about the moral qualifications of candidates seeking public office,
declared the day "Pulpit Freedom Sunday," and then made a list of the
participating pastors and churches public, in effect daring the IRS to
investigate them. 9
Prior to this century, there was only a remote possibility that the courts
would have to address the extent to which the government can regulate the
content of sermons because the IRS appeared to stop its investigations at the
church door. In the few known instances where the IRS challenged a religious
charity for alleged political campaign intervention, the questioned activity
involved religious ministries communicating with the public through mass
media, not pastors speaking to their congregations during regular services.' 0
The only known case involving a church did not occur until the 1990s, and it
focused on the publication of full-page ads in major newspapers, not comments
from the pulpit."I The IRS's timidity in this area, while understandable, has
meant that most commentators have devoted only limited attention to the First
Amendment12 and Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") 13 issues
raised by the prohibition's application to sermons, instead choosing to focus
primarily on the merits of proposals that Congress create a statutory exception
to the prohibition for statements made during regular worship services.1 4
8 Suzanne Sataline, Obama Pastors'Sermons May Violate Tax Laws, WALL ST. J., Mar.

10, 2008, at Al.
I Suzanne Sataline et al., PartisanSunday Sermons Test Federal Tax Laws, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 29, 2008, at A12; Press Release, Alliance Defense Fund, ADF Prepared to Defend
Churches Against Possible IRS Free Speech Investigations (Sept. 29, 2008),
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/story.aspx?cid=4692.
10 See cases cited supra note 3 and accompanying text; sources cited infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
IISee Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
1342 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006).
14 See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participationin PoliticalCampaigns by
CharitiesEssentialto Their Vitality and Democracy?, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1057, 1086 n. 130
(2008); Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law
Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 254-59 (1992);
Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax Code Prohibits;
Why; to What End?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903, 919-23 (2001); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On

Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of
Religious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (concluding

that the prohibition is unconstitutional, but ultimately stating that "[w]hether or not the
Supreme Court ...would adopt this position, I urge the Congress to reconsider the wisdom
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Furthermore, none of these commentators have explored whether and how the
growing body of court decisions and scholarly articles on church autonomy
5
apply to the prohibition. 1
In recent years, the political and enforcement landscapes have changed
Nevertheless, Congress has repeatedly failed to advance
significantly.

proposals to create a statutory exception, with supporters unable to garner a
majority even when the Republicans, who might be more sympathetic to such
legislation, controlled the House of Representatives. 16 At the same time, the
IRS launched a new and apparently well-resourced program to enforce the

of these restraints in light of the constitutional history set forth here"); Richard W. Garnett,
A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatizationof Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 77377 (2001) (focusing on the wisdom of having the government categorize the means by
which religious communities engage the world); Vaughn E. James, The African-American
Church, PoliticalActivity, and Tax Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 406-12 (2007);
Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate - Never the Twain Shall Meet?,
1 PITrSBURGH TAX REV. 35, 65-69 (2003); Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When
Churches Participatein PoliticalCampaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 145, 171-78 (2007);
Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1342-49 (2007) (asserting that
the prohibition is constitutional, but in need of structural changes); Mark Totten, The
Politics of Faith: Rethinking the Prohibitionon Political Campaign Intervention, 18 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 298, 316-20 (2007). But see Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3): Practicaland ConstitutionalImplicationsof "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2
J.L. & POL. 169, 180-98 (1985) (addressing the constitutional issues at length); Steffen N.
Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpit: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the
PoliticalActivities of Religious Organizations,B.C. L. REV. 875, 887-901 (2001) (analyzing
the public policy and First Amendment issues); Meghan J. Ryan, Can the IRS Silence
Religious Organizations?,40 IND. L. REV. 73, 86-96 (2007) (addressing the application of
the "hybrid claim" exception to the Free Exercise Clause rule adopted in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Jennifer M. Smith, Morse Code, Da Vinci Code,
Tax Code and ... Churches: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis of Why Section
501(c)(3) Does Not Apply to Churches, 23 J.L. & POL. 41, 72-84 (2007) (analyzing the
conflicts between the prohibition and the First Amendment).
See supra note 14; discussion infra Part IV.
16 The House rejected the Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, H.R. 2357,
107th Cong. (2001), on a vote of 239 to 178. 148 CONG. REC. 18909 (2002). Since then,
members of Congress have repeatedly introduced similar proposals, but none of those bills
have made it out of committee. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Act of 2007, S. 178, 110th
Cong. (2007); Religious Freedom Act of 2006, S.3957, 109th Cong. (2006); Houses of
Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 235, 109th Cong. (2005); Houses of
Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235, 108th Cong. (2003); Houses of Worship
Political Speech Protection Act, S.2886, 107th Cong. (2002); Bright-Line Act of 2001, H.R.
2931, 107th Cong. (2001); see also H.R. 2275, 110th Cong. (2007) (attempting to repeal the
prohibition entirely). See generally ERIKA LUNDER & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV.,

CHURCHES AND CAMPAIGN AcTIvITY: ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSES OF

WORSHIP FREE SPEECH RESTORATION ACT AND SIMILAR LEGISLATION 7-10 (2008).
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prohibition.' 7 The growing availability of information about the activities of
houses of worship through CDs, DVDs, YouTube videos, and websites of
houses of worship has aided the IRS in its enforcement efforts. 18 In response
to this program, which has led to audits of dozens of houses of worship, two
legal groups supporting religious freedom have offered to defend all houses of
worship targeted by the IRS because of comments from the pulpit.' 9 Unless
the IRS suddenly abandons its enforcement efforts with respect to houses of
worship, it is almost inevitable that free exercise of religion challenges to the
prohibition as applied to sermons will have their day in court.
The resolution of such challenges will not be simple. Application of the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause is complicated by the unsettled
nature of the law prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Employment Division v. Smith,20 as well as the uncertain scope of exceptions to
the rule announced in Smith. Congress's attempt to overrule Smith by enacting
RFRA further muddies the waters - courts are still wrestling with the extent to
which RFRA follows pre-Smith case law as opposed to imposing a different
and higher standard on federal laws that substantially burden exercise of
religion. Previous case law upholding tax-based restrictions on charities'
speech also does not resolve these questions, as it does not address the unique
context of sermons. Resolving these unsettled questions will therefore be
necessary to resolve this issue and will have ramifications for free exercise
claims in many other contexts.
The purpose of this Article is to anticipate and suggest answers to these
questions. The answers indicate that a First Amendment free exercise
challenge to the prohibition will ultimately fail under the current standards
applied by federal courts, even if one of the exceptions to the Smith rule
applies. 2' Houses of worship will, however, have a strong argument that
RFRA requires an exception to the prohibition in the unique context of inperson sermons during regular worship services. The reason for this predicted
17See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Sataline, supra note 8 (stating the newspaper had reviewed thirteen sermons
either "seen live or through church-recorded DVDs"); Paul Vitello, Pastors' Web
ElectioneeringAttracts U.S. Reviews of Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at BI
(reporting that webcasting has led to new IRS scrutiny of churches' political activity).
19See Alliance Defense Fund, The Pulpit Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 8,
2008), http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/PulpitInitiativeFAQ.pdf (stating that
it will represent, at no charge, participating churches subjected to IRS investigation); Letter
from Kevin J. Hasson, Chairman, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, to Religious
Leader (Sept. 17, 2004), http://www.freepreach.org/letter.pdf (offering to defend religious
groups, at no charge, against IRS investigation for any "good faith religious message ...
preached from the pulpit").
20 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
21 While this Article does not directly address the question of whether a First
Amendment free speech challenge would succeed in this context, there are reasons to
believe that it would not. See infra note 185.
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success is that application of the prohibition to such sermons will substantially
burden the exercise of religion (as RFRA uses those terms) by some houses of
worship because of the inability to separate a political sermon from a house of
worship's other activities. 22 Once a house of worship demonstrates the
existence of such a substantial burden, RFRA requires the government to
demonstrate that the prohibition is the least restrictive means for furthering a
compelling governmental interest, a high standard of scrutiny that will be very
difficult for the government to meet.
Houses of worship have another argument based on a possible extension of
developing case law that would support a Free Exercise Clause challenge and
strengthen their RFRA claim. This extension expands the existing "church
autonomy doctrine" into a full-blown institutional view of free exercise that
recognizes the importance of religious institutions in ensuring individuals' free
This institutional view would also be an
exercise of religion.
acknowledgement that under the Free Exercise Clause, there are not only areas
where government interests, such as prisons, the military, use of public lands,
and internal administration, should easily overcome free exercise of religion
concerns, but also areas where religious institution interests, such as intrachurch disputes, ministerial employment decisions, and internal religious
communications, should easily overcome government concerns.
Part I of this Article begins by briefly discussing the history and current
scope of the political campaign intervention prohibition, including the recent
enforcement efforts and likelihood that many sermons violate the prohibition.
Part II explains why a sermon-based challenge to the prohibition should
ultimately fail under the First Amendment when applying existing case law.
Part III explores the history and meaning of RFRA, and why a RFRA-based
challenge to the prohibition has a strong chance of succeeding for some houses
of worship. Part IV examines another possible claim based on the church
autonomy doctrine cases that are not well known but growing in momentum,
as well as scholarship generally advocating an institutional approach to
constitutional rights. Combining these approaches, this Article concludes that
the church autonomy doctrine's protection should logically extend to internal
house of worship religious communications, particularly sermons and other
forms of teaching during regular worship services. The reasoning behind this
conclusion is that such communications are an essential part of institutional
religious activity, and protection of such institutional activity is a necessary
part of protecting individual free exercise of religion. This institutional free
exercise approach also has implications for a RFRA-based challenge, as

22

For purposes of this Article, a "political sermon" is a sermon that discusses a candidate

for public office in a manner that violates the federal government's interpretation of the
political campaign intervention prohibition, as described infra notes 39-44 and
accompanying text.
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elaborated in Part IV.23 Part V briefly addresses some of the issues raised by
an exception to the prohibition, whether based on the Constitution or RFRA.
Finally, this Article concludes by noting some of the broader free exercise
ramifications of resolving these issues in the political sermon context.
I.

THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION PROHIBITION

The prohibition is found in the federal tax laws, which condition the receipt
of certain tax benefits available to charities on, among other restrictions, "not
participat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in (including the publishing or distributing
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office. ' '24
While initially ignored by academic
commentators, for the past couple of decades the prohibition has been the
subject of often-heated debate on both its desirability on policy grounds and its
constitutionality. 25 Despite this debate, however, it has remained essentially
26
unchanged for over fifty years.
The lack of any significant changes may be explained in part by the limited
enforcement of the prohibition, which was spotty at best until this decade. 27 In
2004, however, the IRS began a dedicated enforcement program that
uncovered numerous apparent violations by houses of worship, and there is

significant evidence that there are many more violations yet to be discovered. 28
It therefore seems inevitable that the courts will have to address the application
of the prohibition to a pastor speaking from the pulpit.

23 This approach may also have significant ramifications for parallel state constitutional
provisions and state versions of RFRA, but discussion of these state-level effects is beyond
the scope of this Article.
24 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006) (regarding eligibility to receive tax-deductible charitable
contributions); id. § 501(c)(3) (regarding exemption from federal income tax). For purposes
of this Article, the term "charity" refers to any organization described in these sections of
the Internal Revenue Code. The same prohibition applies to eligibility to receive gifts and
bequests that are exempt from federal gift and estate taxes, respectively. Id. § 2055(a)(2)
(estate tax); id. § 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (estate tax applicable to estates of nonresident who
are not citizens); id. § 2522(a)(2), (b)(2)-(3) (gift tax).
25 See Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposalfor Peaceful Coexistence,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308, 308 (1990) (stating that until "recent years" the prohibition had
"generated little discussion"); articles cited supra note 14.
26 The only amendment was the addition of the parenthetical phrase "(or in opposition
to)" in 1987. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10711(a), 101 Stat. 382, 464
(codified as amended I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501(c)(3), 2055(a)(2)-(3), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii)(iii), 2522(a)(2), 2522(b)(2)-(3)). The stated purpose of this amendment was simply to
clarify, consistent with existing Treasury Department Regulations, that the prohibition
extended to opposing candidates for elected public office. H.R. REP.No. 100-391, at 1621
(1987); H.R. REP. No. 100-495, at 1018 (1987).
27 See discussion infra Part I.B.
28 See discussion infra Part I.B.
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The History and Scope of the Prohibition

Congress enacted the prohibition in 1954 after then-Senator Lyndon
29
Johnson added it as an amendment to an existing tax bill on the Senate floor.
Johnson's motivation for introducing the amendment is unclear, as is the extent
to which the prohibition reflected generally accepted views about the
appropriate involvement of charities in politics and the amendment's intended
scope. 30 There is also no evidence that either he or other members of Congress
specifically intended to restrict the activities of houses3 1 of worship or even
considered the impact of the prohibition on such entities.
The uncertainty about Congress's exact intentions in enacting the
prohibition and the lack of any significant legislative history left it to the
Treasury Department and particularly the IRS to determine the prohibition's
reach. The IRS has made it clear that the prohibition applies to all charities organizations that are both exempt from federal income tax under Internal
Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and eligible to receive tax-deductible
charitable contributions under section 170(c)(2). 32 Most organizations seeking
federal tax status as a charity must apply to the IRS for recognition that they

meet the qualifications for tax exemption, including complying with the
29 See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (originally

introduced as H.R. 8300); 100 CONG. REC. 9602, 9604 (1954) (agreeing to Senator
Johnson's proposal to include the prohibition as an amendment to H.R. 8300).
30 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and
Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and
Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2003) (attributing the prohibition to Johnson's
desire to stop certain Texas foundations from opposing his re-election); Murphy, supra note
14, at 54-55, 62 (arguing that the prohibition arose from Congress's long standing suspicion
of charities' political activities combined with McCarthy era paranoia); Patrick L. O'Daniel,
More Honored in the Breach: A HistoricalPerspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibitionon
Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733, 768 (2001) (stating that Johnson's
motivation for the amendment was not to stop tax-exempt churches from intervening in
political campaigns); see also Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues,
in

EXEMPT

INSTRUCTION

ORGANIZATIONS

CONTINUING

PROFESSIONAL

EDUCATION

PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, 335, 448-51

TECHNICAL

(2001), available at

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/topici02.pdf (summarizing four theories for why Congress
enacted the prohibition and ultimately concluding "[p]erhaps all four are true").
31 See 100 CONG. REC. 9602, 9604 (1954) (reporting no discussion regarding the
prohibition and houses of worship); Dessingue, supra note 14, at 917 & n.51 (concluding,
based in part on the recollection of Johnson's chief aide, that Johnson did not intend or
consider the effect of the prohibition on religious organizations); Murphy, supra note 14, at
53-54 (mentioning that before enactment of the prohibition, three members of a House of
Representatives committee investigated the political activities of tax-exempt organizations
and had no concerns about religious leaders engaging in political activity through churches);
O'Daniel, supra note 30, at 768 ("There is no evidence that a religious element played a
significant part in Johnson's decision to ban certain tax-exempt entities - including churches
- from intervening in support of a political candidate.").
32 Kindell & Reilly, supra note 30, at 339.
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prohibition.33 Even organizations that are not required to file an application to
be considered a charity - including houses of worship - are subject to the
prohibition. 34 As interpreted by the IRS, the prohibition applies to all
communications and activities by charities, including religious leaders'
35
statements to their congregations during regular worship services.
It should be noted, however, that the prohibition does not extend to other
types of organizations exempt from federal income tax but ineligible to receive
tax-deductible contributions. 36 The prohibition is therefore only a condition on
the ability to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, not on being
exempt from federal income tax, although this point is often overlooked. For
constitutional reasons detailed later in this Article, the IRS also permits
charities - whether secular or religious - to create and share resources with
such tax-exempt non-charitable organizations, as long as charitable funds are
not used to pay for activities that the charity itself could not engage in
directly. 37 The result of permitting such close affiliations is that if the
leadership of a charity wants to engage in prohibited political campaign
intervention, it can generally create a closely related non-charitable affiliate to
intervene, as long as it uses non-charitable (non-deductible) funds to do so.
This Article discusses the legal significance of this ability to speak through an
38
alternate channel below.
With respect to the scope of activities covered by the prohibition, the
Treasury Department and the IRS have clarified various aspects over time. For
example, they have defined the term "candidate for public office" as meaning
any individual who offers herself, or is proposed by others, for elective public
office at any level of government. 39 They have also issued numerous
precedential and non-precedential materials on when candidate-related
40
activities such as voter guides and candidate forums violate the prohibition.

33 I.R.C. § 508(a) (2006) (providing that organizations organized after October 9, 1969
must apply to the IRS for § 501(c)(3) status).
4 See I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A) (2006) (exempting houses of worship and certain house of
worship-related organizations from having to apply for § 501(c)(3) status); Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 141-42 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (considering and rejecting the
argument that tax-exempt churches are not subject to prohibition).
35 See

INTERNAL

REVENUE

SERV.,

TAX

GUIDE

FOR

CHURCHES

AND

RELIGIOUS

8 (2008) [hereinafter IRS, TAx GUIDE] (providing as an example of
political campaign intervention by a church a situation where a minister, while preaching
during a regular worship service, urges the congregation to vote for a particular candidate).
36 See Kindell & Reilly, supra note 30, at 433-34.
37 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
38 See infra notes 163-186 and accompanying text.
39 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2008).
40 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421, 1421-26 (providing twenty-one
examples illustrating when a tax-exempt organization violates the prohibition); IRS, TAX
GUIDE, supra note 35, at 7-15 (discussing examples of the prohibition's application to
ORGANIZATIONS

2009]

1147

POLITICS AT THE PULPIT

Nevertheless, the prohibition's exact scope still remains uncertain because the
IRS relies primarily on a "facts and circumstances" test to determine whether
any given activity violates the prohibition. 4' For example, the IRS view on
whether an "issue ad" mentioning a candidate violates the prohibition depends
on consideration of at least seven factors to determine if the ad supports or
opposes the election of the candidate. 42 The factors include the timing of the
ad with respect to an upcoming election and whether it expresses approval or
disapproval of one or more of a candidate's positions or actions. 43 The use of
numerous factors and considerations has led critics of the government's
approach to refer to it as an ambiguous "smell" test.44 Other candidate and
election-related activities such as voter guides, candidate questionnaires,
candidate forums, and voter registration drives are subject to similar multi45
factor analyses to determine whether they violate the prohibition.
Application of the ambiguous facts and circumstances test has potentially
serious ramifications. In theory, both an organization's tax-exempt status and
its ability to receive tax-deductible contributions are forfeit if an organization
violates the prohibition even slightly. In practice, the IRS usually opts for
issuing a warning letter and requiring adoption of policies to prevent future
violations. 46 Nonetheless, the IRS has extreme penalties available to it and has
imposed them on occasion, especially in recent years as the IRS has stepped up
47
its enforcement of the prohibition.
B.

The Enforcement of the Prohibition

Information about IRS enforcement of the prohibition has been quite limited
because statute prohibits the IRS from discussing specific audit results. 48 The
paucity of court cases involving the prohibition indicates, however, that the

churches); Kindell & Reilly, supra note 30, at 369-87 (summarizing the guidance available
in 2001 on specific candidate-related activities).
41 See Rev. Rul. 2007-41.
42 Id.
43 Id.

44 E.g., OMB WATCH, THE IRS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM FOR
CHARITIES AND RELIGIOUS

ORGANIZATIONS: QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS

12-13 (2006),

available at http://www.ombwatch.org/files/pdfs/paci-full.pdf; EO Committee of ABA Tax
Section Offers Commentary on Politicking, 11 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 854, 856 (1995); see
also Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads:Tax and Campaign
Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of PoliticalActivities of Tax-Exempt Organizations,31
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 64-71, 65 n.39 (2004) (summarizing the existing guidance and

concluding that the exact scope of the prohibition remains frustratingly ambiguous).
45 See sources cited supra note 40.
46 See discussion infra Part I.B.
47 See discussion infra Part I.B.
48 See I.R.C. § 6103 (2006).
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IRS has rarely imposed penalties for violations. 49 There have been only five
other reported instances where a charity lost its tax-exempt status because of
political activity, with some losing it just for a limited period. 50 While it is
possible that other charities have lost their tax-exempt status because of
political activity without contesting the revocation in court, a review of IRS
rulings over the past ten or so years reveals only a handful of cases where the
most
IRS even imposed the excise tax penalty for violating the prohibition, and
5
of those rulings do not even mention revocation as a possible sanction. '
The IRS changed its stance in the 2004 election year when it launched a
dedicated enforcement effort to detect and pursue violations of the
prohibition.5 2 In a report on this effort, the IRS stated that it found violations
by forty-two houses of worship in 2004, possible violations by a similar

41 See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ass'n of
the Bar of N.Y. v. Comm'r, 858 F.2d 876, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Dykema,
666 F.2d 1096, 1104 (7th Cir. 1981); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States,
470 F.2d 849, 853-56, 858 (10th Cir. 1972).
" See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing the
revocation of The Way International's tax-exempt status), aff'd, 211 F.3d 137; Celia Roady,
Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations: Federal Income Tax Rules and
Restrictions, 22 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 401, 406 n.44 (1998) (discussing the apparent
revocation of Jimmy Swaggart Ministries' tax-exempt status); Press Release, Catholics for
Free Choice, Operation Rescue West Loses Tax Exempt Status (Sept. 13, 2006), reprinted
in 2006 TAX NoTEs TODAY 178-38 (reporting the revocation of the tax-exempt status of
Youth Ministries, Inc., which did business as Operation Rescue West); News Release, The
Christian Broadcasting Network Hour (Mar. 16, 1998), reprinted in 98 TAx NOTES TODAY
55-78 (announcing the two-year revocation of the tax-exempt status of Pat Robertson's
Christian Broadcasting Network and the permanent revocation of the tax-exempt status of
three former CBN affiliates); Public Statement, Jerry Falwell, President, Old Time Gospel
Hour (Feb. 17, 1993), reprinted in 93 TAx NOTEs TODAY 81-46 (announcing the two-year
revocation of the tax-exempt status of Jerry Falwell's Old Time Gospel Hour).
"' See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2004-46-033 (Nov. 12, 2004); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
2004-37-040 (Sept. 10, 2004); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2000-44-038 (Nov. 3, 2000); I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999-07-021 (Feb. 19, 1999); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-12-001 (Mar.
20, 1998); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-35-003 (Aug. 30, 1996); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9609-007 (Mar. 1, 1996); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001 (Apr. 26, 1991).
52 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FINAL REPORT: PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 1 (2006) [hereinafter IRS, 2004 PACI REPORT] (reporting on the
results of the Political Activities Compliance Initiative ("PACI") for 2004); INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., 2006 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INmATIVE 1 (2007) [hereinafter

IRS, 2006 PACI REPORT] (reporting on the results of the PACI for the 2006 election year);
Memorandum from Lois G. Lerner, Dir., Exempt Orgs. Division, Internal Revenue Serv., to
Marsha Ramirez, Dir., Exempt Orgs. Examinations, Internal Revenue Serv., et al. (Apr. 17,
2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2008-paci-program-letter.pdf (describing goals of
the PACI for the 2008 election cycle). See generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping
Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on PoliticalActivities by Charities, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV.
1,7-13 (2007) (summarizing the IRS's recent enforcement efforts).
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number in 2006 (also an election year for which the IRS has yet to announce
the results of most of its audits), and apparent direct contributions to candidates
by another eighty-seven houses of worship during 2003, 2004, and 2005.53 For
the 2004 election year, the IRS found twelve instances where a house of
worship official made a statement during normal services endorsing or
opposing a candidate for elected public office, 54 and it has received a similar
55
number of accusations for the 2006 election year.
To date the IRS has resolved the vast majority of violations, whether
involving houses of worship or statements from the pulpit, through written
advisories instead of imposing any penalty. 56 It seems unlikely, however, that
the IRS can continue to be this lenient without undermining its credibility,
especially since it has worked hard to inform charities, including houses of
worship, of the prohibition, thus eliminating ignorance of the law as a plausible
excuse. 57 There is also reason to believe that violations of the prohibition are
significantly more widespread than the IRS's efforts have thus far uncovered.
C.

Evidence of Violations by Houses of Worship

There are several pieces of evidence indicating a significantly higher
number of violations by houses of worship than the IRS has apparently
discovered.
For example, a 2001 survey of clergy from a variety of
denominations regarding their political activities during the 2000 election year
found that six percent of evangelical Protestant clergy, two percent of mainline
Protestant clergy, and one percent of Roman Catholic clergy endorsed one or
more candidates from the pulpit. 58 This level of involvement does not appear
to be unique to the 2000 election, as a survey conducted in 1989 found a
similar response rate for the first two groups. 59 While the percentages are low,
the 2001 survey included most major denominations and is thus relevant for
53 IRS, 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 52, at 3, 5-6.
54 IRS, 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 52, at 16.
55 See IRS, 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 52, at 4 (reporting the types of allegations
that led to examinations during both the 2004 and 2006 election years).
56 Id. at 5 (reporting results of closed cases, which included for the 2004 election year
only seven proposed or final revocations of tax-exempt status, none of which applied to
houses of worship, and no instances of financial penalties); id. at 7 (reporting results of
candidate contribution cases, some of which have resulted in payment of financial
penalties).

17 See Internal Revenue Serv., Political Campaign Intervention by 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt
Organizations - Educating Exempt Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/
article/0,,id=179750,00.html (last visited July 26, 2009).
58 Corwin E. Smidt, The World Is Not My Home? Patterns of Clerical Involvement in
Politics over Time, in PULPIT AND POLITICS: CLERGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS AT THE ADVENT

OF THE MILLENNIUM 301, 312 (Corwin E. Smidt ed., 2004) (reporting the results of surveys

conducted under the auspices of the Henry Institute for the Study of Christianity and Politics
at Calvin College).

" See id.
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the vast majority of the over 340,000 houses of worship in the United States, 60a
small percentage of which would represent thousands of congregations.
Similarly, the Pew Research Center found that after the 2006 election, seven
percent of Americans who attended religious services monthly reported that
"they had been urged to
vote for particular candidates or parties" by clergy or
61
other religious groups.

A separate article relating to a 2001 survey relies solely on responses from
clergy in African Methodist Episcopal and Church of God in Christ churches,
both predominantly African American denominations which together report
having almost 20,000 churches. 62 When those clergy were asked whether they
had endorsed a candidate while preaching in 2000 - a slightly different
question than had been asked in the surveys of other denominations - forty-six
percent responded affirmatively. 63 While both the low response rate and
ambiguously worded question - which may have captured preaching outside of
regular services - caution against drawing too strong a conclusion, these
results indicate that many clergies in these denominations are supporting (and
probably opposing) candidates from the pulpit. 64 Such a finding is not
surprising given the long tradition of politically active African American
churches .65

Finally, as previously noted, when the Alliance Defense Fund recently
called on pastors to "deliver Scripture-based sermons from the pulpits of their
churches comparing and contrasting the differing positions of the presidential
candidates in light of Scripture" on "Pulpit Freedom Sunday," over thirty
pastors publicly took up the challenge. 66 Similarly, the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty found a pastor who not only violated the prohibition, but also
60 See YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN & CANADIAN CHURCHES 2008, at 381 (Eileen W. Lindner

ed., 2008) (disclosing a total based on the number of churches reporting within each
reported religious body for 2006 or earlier). The actual number of houses of worship may
differ somewhat from this figure, as the Yearbook relies on voluntary reporting and data
collection standards vary between religious bodies. Id. at 9 (discussing methodology and
concluding that it is reasonably accurate).
61 GREG SMITH, ScoTr KEETER & JOHN GREEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., RELIGIOUS GROUPS

REACT TO THE 2006 ELECTION (2006), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/99/religious-

groups-react-to-the-2006-election. The significance of this study is limited by the fact that
the survey did not ask respondents about the context in which they received such messages,
leaving open the possibility that they received the messages outside of a house of worship.
See id.
62 Eric McDaniel, Black Clergy in the 2000 Election, 42 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 533,

534 (2003).
63

Id. at 540-41.

6 Id. at 535 (recognizing that the 10.8% response rate "necessitates some caution in
generalizing the results of this research as reflective of the population being examined").
65 See James, supra note 14, at 391-96 (describing the history of African American
churches' political involvement and tracing it back as far as the post-Emancipation period).
I See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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willingly signed a public letter to the IRS challenging it to investigate,
published at the Becket Fund's expense as a full-page ad in the Wall Street
67
Journal.
This information strongly indicates that sermon-related violations of the
prohibition are not in short supply, numerous pastors and houses of worship
are willing to defy the prohibition knowingly, and legal resources are readily
available to contest any IRS attempt to impose penalties on such houses of
worship and their pastors. Therefore the courts will almost certainly have to
address the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA issues implicated by such a
dispute. It is to those issues that we now turn.
II.

CURRENT FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE LAW

The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. '68 The
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith 69 dominates First
Amendment case law addressing government action claimed to burden an
individual's exercise of religion. This Part therefore starts with Smith, explores
the various exceptions to the rule adopted in the decision, and then discusses
the pre-Smith case law that applies in exception cases. The Section concludes
that a Free Exercise Clause-based challenge to the prohibition, even in the
context of a sermon, would almost certainly fail under both Smith and, if one
of the exceptions to Smith applied, the pre-Smith case law.
A.

Employment Division v. Smith

In Employment Division v. Smith, the Employment Division of the
Department of Human Resources of Oregon denied unemployment
compensation to two members of the Native American Church because their
employer, a private drug rehabilitation organization, discharged them for
sacramental use of peyote at a church ceremony. 70 The Oregon Supreme Court
decided that the denial of benefits did not survive First Amendment scrutiny
because it burdened the religious practices of the claimants and was not
sufficiently justified by the state's interest in maintaining the financial integrity
of its unemployment compensation fund. 71 It also concluded that while
Oregon's criminal law prohibited peyote use, that prohibition could not apply
to sacramental use, again under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
72
Amendment.
67 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
68

Id. at 874.
71Id. at 875; Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 450-51 (Or. 1986); Black v.
Employment Div., 721 P.2d 451, 453 (Or. 1986) (companion case to Smith v. Employment
Div., 721 P.2d 445).
72 Smith, 494 U.S. at 876; Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148-49 (Or. 1988).
70
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The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, concluding that the Free
Exercise Clause did not create an exception to Oregon's criminal statute
prohibiting the use of peyote and, since the basis of the discharge and denial of
benefits was a criminal act, the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the denial
of benefits for sacramental peyote use. 73 What made the decision so
significant is that the Court reached this conclusion by reasoning that the Free
Exercise Clause did not excuse religiously motivated individuals from having
to comply with otherwise valid, neutral, and generally applicable laws, and so
the government did not have to demonstrate that such laws served a
74
compelling interest even if they substantially burdened religious practices.
This reasoning departed from at least the language of earlier free exercise
decisions, which required the government to make a compelling interest
demonstration (and to show the law at issue was narrowly tailored to serve that
interest) if a law substantially burdened religious exercise, regardless of
whether it was neutral and generally applicable. 75 While the courts, and even
some of the Supreme Court justices, often did not apply this strict scrutiny
before Smith, 76 Smith was the first time the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
strict scrutiny with respect to valid, neutral, and generally applicable laws.
Criticism of the Smith decision was fast and furious, including among
academics, who almost uniformly lined up against it. 77 For reasons that will
become clear, however, even if the Court's reasoning in Smith is incorrect,
elimination of the Smith rule would not change the result of a First Amendment
challenge to the prohibition. Nevertheless, the Smith decision remains the
prevailing interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, and so any free exercise
challenge to the political campaign intervention prohibition must address the
Smith rule.

Before moving to the exceptions to the Smith rule, a few points need
elucidation. First, there is no doubt that the political campaign intervention
prohibition is a valid law under Congress's general Sixteenth Amendment
authority to impose an income tax. 78 Second, while there is some ambiguity
73 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("Because respondents' ingestion of peyote was prohibited
under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent
with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their
dismissal results from use of the drug.").
74

Id. at 878-79.

75 See infra Part II.C.
76 E.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708-12 (1986) (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell &
Rehnquist, JJ., plurality opinion); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 & n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
7 See infra note 122.
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes .... "); Joseph M. Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to
the Taxation of Non-Excludable Personal Injury Awards, 8 FLA. TAx REV. 369, 372-73
(2007).
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regarding what is a neutral and generally applicable law, there can be no doubt
that the prohibition is, on its face, neutral and generally applicable. The
prohibition is neutral in that there is no evidence that Congress enacted the
prohibition to discriminate against religious organizations, whether one
examines the words of the prohibition itself, its (minimal) legislative history,
or its actual effect. 79 The prohibition is generally applicable because it applies
to all organizations qualified to receive tax-deductible contributions, regardless
of whether the motivation for their activities (including violating the
prohibition) is religious. 80 Finally, while the law at issue in Smith was a
81
criminal law, later decisions make it clear that its reasoning is not so limited.
The prohibition therefore falls squarely within the Smith interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. As a result, any free exercise challenge to the
prohibition will fail unless one of the exceptions to the Smith rule applies.
B.

Exceptions to the Smith Rule

In Smith, the Supreme Court chose to distinguish, rather than overrule, its
earlier decisions concluding that a neutral and generally applicable law
violated the Free Exercise Clause. In doing so, the Court acknowledged two
exceptions to the Smith rule: (1) "hybrid" claims that implicate one or more
constitutional provisions other than the Free Exercise Clause, and (2) laws that

permit individual exemption determinations. 82

Smith, however, clearly

explained neither the contours nor the effects of these exceptions.
Furthermore, besides these explicit exceptions, the reasoning of Smith indicates
that there may be a third exception for facially neutral laws that are at

significant risk of not being applied neutrally because they grant significant

71 See supra notes 24, 29-31 and accompanying text; see also Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-42 (1992) (stating "if the object of a
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is
not neutral" and describing the relevant facts for determining whether a law has such an
object).
I See supra notes 32, 34 and accompanying text; see also Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S.
at 54345 (stating that to meet the general applicability requirement the government "cannot
in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief' and
describing the relevant facts for determining if the government has been selective in this
manner).
81See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511-14, 535 (1997) (involving a municipal
ordinance); Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 96 n.6 (1st Cir. 2008) (listing cases from four
circuits that apply Smith to non-criminal laws), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 56 (2008).
82 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82, 884 (1990). The Court also
recognized that the rule it announced in Smith would not apply to government actions
involving religious beliefs (as opposed to religiously motivated conduct), government
actions designed to punish or inhibit specific religious views, and requests for courts to
resolve internal religious organization disputes turning on questions of religious doctrine.
Id. at 877.
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discretion to the government officials applying them (but not through
individual exemption determinations).
At first glance, the hybrid claim exception would appear to fit the house of
worship context perfectly, as any challenge to the prohibition in this context
also implicates freedom of speech. The lower courts, however, have struggled
with the hybrid claim exception because the Court did not clarify the effect of
having a hybrid claim. 8 3 The Supreme Court's hybrid claim discussion
appears to have been primarily an attempt to avoid overturning Wisconsin v.
Yoder s4 and a line of cases involving religious expression.8 5 This helps explain
why Justice Souter and many commentators have found the hybrid claim
exception to be untenable or fundamentally inconsistent with the First
Amendment to the extent it would apply a different standard than would
otherwise apply to each of the constitutional rights if asserted separately. 86 A
minority position, however, is that a hybrid claim either is subject to the preSmith standard or only requires a "colorable claim" that either constitutional
right at issue has been violated to invoke strict scrutiny review. 87 While the
majority view seems correct for the reasons provided by its proponents, if the
minority view prevails in the courts and a sermon-based challenge could take
advantage of it, doing so would ultimately be to no avail for the reasons
88
discussed below.

83 See Parker, 514 F.3d at 97-99 (reviewing the various positions taken by courts and
commentators).
84 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
81 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881; Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False
Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 187-88
(2002); Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 153-54
(2004); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) ("One suspects that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was
created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case.").
86 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566-67
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180
(6th Cir. 1993); Brownstein, supra note 85, at 188-93; Greenwalt, supra note 85, at 153-54
(2004); Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability
Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 630-32
(2003) (summarizing the criticisms and limited use of the hybrid claim exception);
McConnell, supra note 85, at 1122.
87 See Parker, 514 F.3d at 97-98; Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule"
Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights
Exception," 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573, 587-601 (2003); Meghan J. Ryan, Can the IRS
Silence Religious Organizations?,40 IND. L. REV. 73, 87-88 (2007); see also Robert M.
O'Neil, Religious Expression: Speech or Worship - or Both?, 54 Mo. L. REV. 501, 505-06
(1989) (discussing, prior to Smith, four theories for the level of protection that religious
expression, which involves both free exercise and free speech, should have under the First
Amendment).
88 See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. Although discussion of a freedom-ofspeech-based challenge is beyond the scope of this Article, there are strong reasons to
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The other exception explicitly acknowledged by the Court in Smith - again
to distinguish several of its earlier decisions - was for laws under which the
government has a system of individual exemptions. 89 In that situation, the
Court concluded that not permitting exemptions for "religious hardship"
required a compelling reason. 90 Here, however, the political campaign
intervention prohibition has no such system of individual exemptions and,
according to the IRS, it applies to all charities and their activities. 91 While the
IRS's limited enforcement activities in past years may have raised the question
of whether such a system of individual exemptions existed in practice, the
IRS's more vigorous
recent efforts indicate that such a system no longer exists,
92
if it ever did.
Besides these explicit exceptions to the rule stated in Smith, there is
arguably another exception for laws that are neutral on their face but for which
there is a substantial risk of non-neutral application. Since government
officials charged with enforcing these laws have broad discretion in
determining whether a violation has occurred, those officials can shade their
decisions in a manner that either favors some religious practices over others or
favors secular entities over religious ones. Essentially, such an exception
would be a more generalized version of the individual exemptions exception.
Even if this last exception exists, however, it is not clear that a house of
worship claimant challenging the prohibition could fall within it. The
"discretion" in this context is in defining the exact parameters of what
93
constitutes support or opposition of a candidate for elected public office.
Despite numerous efforts by the Treasury Department and IRS, the exact scope
of the prohibition remains unclear even to some IRS employees. 94 Regardless,
believe that it would also be unsuccessful even if the hybrid exception did apply. See infra
note 185.
89 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884; see also Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v.
City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding this exception applied when
the government granted categorical "medical exemptions while refusing religious
exemptions"); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1553-54 (D. Neb. 1996) (concluding
this exception applied when the government granted discretionary exemptions to an
otherwise generally applicable rule in broad range of circumstances, but not when sought for
religious reasons); Brownstein, supra note 85, at 193-94; Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise
and Individualized Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious
Liberty, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1202-03 (2005).
90Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
91 See supra notes 32, 34-35 and accompanying text.
92 See supra Part I.B.

93See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
94 See INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE No. 2008-10-117, IMPROVEMENTS
HAVE

BEEN MADE

TO

EDUCATE TAX-EXEMPT

ORGANIZATIONS

AND

ENFORCE

THE

PROHBMON AGAINST POLITICAL ACITIES, BUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS ARE POSSIBLE 2

(2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/20081011 7fr.pdf

("[E]mployees within the [Exempt Organizations] function did not always understand why
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there is no recent evidence that this discretion has led to the targeting of
particular faiths, religious practices, or political views. Both government
agencies and courts that recently investigated charges of discriminatory
enforcement of the prohibition have concluded that no such discrimination
exists. 95 This exception would therefore only apply if it extended not only to
situations where there was some evidence of non-neutral application, but also
to situations where non-neutral application was a mere possibility - even if it
had not been shown to exist. While defining the exception this broadly would
not necessarily encompass normal prosecutorial discretion, it would potentially
cover any law where the definition of a violation required any significant
amount of interpretation by a government official. Perhaps the vagueness of
the definition in this context is so extreme that, regardless of the exact
parameters of the exception, the prohibition clearly falls within it. However, it
is hard to know where the exception's limit would be if it did not require at
least some actual evidence of non-neutral application as opposed to the mere
possibility of non-neutral application. Thus, the better96position is that absent
such evidence, this possible exception would not apply.
Therefore none of the exceptions would avail a house of worship
challenging the political campaign intervention prohibition and so the Smith
rule would control. If this is correct, such a challenge would fail under current
Free Exercise Clause law. What if this prediction is incorrect, in that either the
minority view of hybrid claims prevails or one of the other two exceptions is
found to apply? Even if this occurred, a challenger would still only be
successful if the claim would have succeeded under pre-Smith case law.

certain referrals were not included . .. despite having issues similar to referrals that were
included.").
95United States v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 371 F.3d 824, 829-31 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding
no political motivation behind audit); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 14445
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding no discrimination against a Church whose tax-exempt status was
revoked); INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE No. 2005-10-035, REVIEW OF THE
EXEMPT

ORGANIZATIONS

FUNCTION

PROCESS

FOR

REVIEWING

ALLEGED

POLITICAL

[hereinafter
INSPECTOR, REVIEW], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2005reports/
200510035fr.pdf; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106th CONG., REPORT OF
CAMPAIGN

INTERVENTION

BY

TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS

1-3

(2005)

INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF

TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS 6 (Comm. Print 2000) ("The Joint Committee staff

found no credible evidence that the IRS delayed or accelerated issuance of determination
letters to tax-exempt organizations based on the nature of the organization's perceived
views.").
96 The Supreme Court has found excessive government discretion over licensing or
permitting schemes unconstitutional in the free speech context, but that line of cases
involves prior restraint of speech. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
552-53 (1975).
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The Pre-Smith Case Law

The simple story told about the pre-Smith individual free exercise case law
is that it required the government to meet a strict scrutiny standard whenever a
law substantially burdened the free exercise of religion. Strict scrutiny
requires the government to demonstrate that a law serves a compelling interest
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Since this is such a high level of
this burden
scrutiny, it is expected that the government could not usually meet
97
- hence the oft-quoted phrase "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."
This story is a myth in several respects. First, the Supreme Court did not
apply strict scrutiny prior to the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner.98 Instead, the
Court made a sharp distinction between religious belief - which the
government could not prohibit or punish - and religiously motivated conduct which the government could prohibit or punish without restriction.9 9 Reynolds
v. United States °° established this distinction, which the Court did not revisit
for over eighty years, while upholding a criminal statute banning polygamy. 101
Second, and more importantly, soon after declaring this new strict scrutiny
standard for free exercise claims, the Court quickly began watering down the
standard even while continuing to use its language. Other than Sherbert and
cases with similar facts, the only other free exercise case that truly applies the
standard is Yoder, where the Court found that Amish claimants had a right to
be exempted from compulsory education laws for their children who had

97 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972). While oft-quoted (out of context) to mean that strict scrutiny is fatal for the
government, this level of scrutiny is actually often not fatal, even outside of the free exercise
area. See Adam Winkler, Fatalin Theory and Strict in Fact:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 798-809, 869-71 (2006).
98 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (describing the earlier case law and recognizing that "the
Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of
certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles" but characterizing those cases
as involving "conduct or actions [that] have invariably posed some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order"). The first significant hint by the Court of a shift to this new
standard was the 1961 case of Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), where the Court
for the first time looked to see if a law burdened religious conduct as opposed to belief or
expression. Id. at 605-09.
99See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 937-39 (1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Where

Rights Begin].
10098 U.S. 145 (1878).
10' See id. at 164 ("Congress was deprived [by the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause] of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which
were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."); Brownstein, supra note 85,
at 124-26 (pointing out that pre-Sherbert, the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise
Clause as only protecting religious beliefs and, to some extent, religious speech, but arguing
that the Court's real basis for protecting the latter was the Free Speech Clause).
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completed the eighth grade. 10 2 For a broad range of other cases, commentators
generally agree that the Court either explicitly abandoned strict scrutiny or
used strict scrutiny language, but did not actually apply it. 10 3 While some of
these cases may have turned on questionable judgments that any burden on
exercise of religion was not "substantial," in many of these cases, the courts
14
either acknowledged or assumed that the burden was substantial.
Nevertheless, the government often defeated such challenges by articulating a
general governmental concern without having to demonstrate that the law was
narrowly tailored to serve that concern. 0
The Court's three tax-related cases in this area both illustrate this pattern
and are particularly relevant to the political campaign intervention
prohibition.106 In United States v. Lee, an Amish employer sought a free
exercise exemption from social security tax, based on the Amish belief that
"there is a religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the
kind of assistance contemplated by the social security system."'' 0 The Court
found that the social security tax laws interfered with the Amish claimants'
free exercise rights, but concluded that the government's interest in
maintaining a sound tax system, including mandatory and continuous
participation in and contribution to the social security system, sufficiently
justified this interference. 0 8 The Court made this finding even though there

102 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 234 (1972); Douglas Laycock, Theology
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but
Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 201 (2004); William P. Marshall, Solving the
Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 566 (1983).
13 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND

THE CONSTITUTION 42-44 (2007); Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An
Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 9-11
(1994); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 182-85 (1995) [hereinafter Lupu, Of Time and the
RFRA]; McConnell, supra note 85, at 1110, 1127-28; Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free
Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 299, 316-25; Ellis West, The Case Against a
Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 595-97
(1990).
104 See Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4
CONST. COMMENT. 147, 149 (1987) ("[I]f the Court concludes that strict review is
applicable, it may too readily accept the existence of a 'compelling' governmental interest
and the 'necessity' of the particular regulation as a means of advancing that interest.").
105 Id.
1o On the significance of these cases, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, RFRA and the
Possibility of Justice, 56 MONT. L. REV. 95, 115 (1995) ("Lee marked the beginning of the
end of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine."); Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA, supra note 103, at 18385 ("he leading cases [in which the Supreme Court weakened free exercise review] all
involve taxation.").
107 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
108 Id. at 257-60.
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was no indication that granting the exemption to all Amish employers would
significantly impact the financial soundness of the social security system and
despite a federal statute granting such an exemption to self-employed
Amish. 10 9 The opinion also did not discuss whether the law was narrowly
tailored to serve this interest.
The Court also used a similar rationale to reject a free exercise claim by
sectarian educational institutions that discriminated on the basis of race
because of sincerely held religious beliefs. 110 In Bob Jones University v.
United States, the Court found that the government's general and compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination in education substantially outweighed the
burden imposed on religious exercise by denying tax-exempt status to schools
discriminating on religious grounds."' While the Court did not rely on the
government's interest in maintaining a sound tax system as it did in Lee, the
Court's reliance on a general governmental interest without requiring any
showing that granting the exemption at issue would significantly undermine
that interest is identical to its approach in Lee. The Court in Bob Jones
University also concluded without explanation that there was no 12"less
restrictive means" by which the government could accomplish this goal."
Finally, in Hernandez v. Commissioner, the Court applied the Lee rationale

to defeat a challenge to the denial of a charitable contribution deduction for
amounts paid to various Church of Scientology entities for "auditing" services
required by that faith."13 While expressing skepticism that the loss of the
deduction for such payments constituted a substantial burden, the Court did not
make a final determination on this point, but instead concluded the
government's interest "in maintaining a sound tax system" justified burdening
religious free exercise, regardless of whether the burden was substantial."l 4 As
"o9 See id. at 255 n.4, 256 (noting and citing the statutory exemption then codified in
I.R.C. § 1402(g)); id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that the majority opinion
overstated the risk to the tax system that would be created by granting the claim at issue);
Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA, supra note 103, at 183-84 (criticizing the Court's reasoning in
Lee on the ground that it did not involve a "careful analysis of the marginal costs and
benefits reflected in the conflict" between religious norms and government interests, but
instead relied on a general concern that the government had not demonstrated was plausibly

threatened by the exemption sought). But see Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435 (2006) (citing Lee, 455 U.S. 252, as an example of the
proper application of the compelling governmental interest test); infra notes 253-254 and
accompanying text.
"l See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577-85, 604 (1983).
"' Id. at 604.
112 Id.

113 490 U.S. 680, 683-84, 699-700 (1989). For a discussion of the tax rules at issue in
Hernandez and the IRS's decision to walk away from its victory in that case, see Allan J.
Samansky, Deductibility of Contributions to Religious Institutions, 24 VA. TAX REv. 65, 84-

97 (2004).
114Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. 252).
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in Lee, the Hernandez Court did not address whether the application of the tax
law at issue in this particular context was narrowly tailored to further the
government's interest.
The common criticism of the rationale for each of these cases is that the
Court, while theoretically applying strict scrutiny, actually deferred to the
government's assertion that the laws at issue served a general, compelling
interest - maintaining a sound tax system with only congressionally created
exceptions would be undermined by permitting limited exemptions for those
with certain religious beliefs.' 15 The Court did not require the government to
demonstrate that the law, as applied to the actual claimants, served this
compelling interest, much less that the law was narrowly tailored to further that
interest. Arguably, the Court merely applied the rule that it explicitly stated in
Smith - if a valid, neutral, and generally applicable law is at issue, the
government is not required to meet the strict scrutiny standard. 116 The Court in
Smith appeared to acknowledge that this was the case by citing Lee as support
for the Smith rule, which indicated that it had been applying the Smith rule all
7
along (except for the two exceptions discussed above)."
For a house of worship that successfully argues that Smith does not apply to
the prohibition, this means that the house of worship must still demonstrate
that its religiously-motivated conduct is substantially burdened and that the
prohibition fails not under a literal strict scrutiny standard, but under the lower
standard actually applied in Lee and Hernandez. The substantial burden
requirement will be discussed in Part HI of this article, as it is evident that even
if a house of worship claimant could meet that requirement its claim would fail
under the Lee standard.
As already discussed, Lee and Hernandez demonstrate strong deference to
the government's administration of the tax system. ' 8 By recognizing
administration of the tax system without religious exemptions as a compelling
governmental interest and essentially ignoring the narrowly tailored
requirement, the Court established a standard of scrutiny that makes the
success of any free exercise challenge to a tax law provision nearly impossible
unless the provision discriminates against religious beliefs. For the reasons
already discussed with respect to the Smith rule, the RFRA prohibition is not
discriminatory in this fashion and thus easily falls within the scope of Lee and
Hernandez.'19 While a house of worship could challenge the Lee standard as
incorrect, the subsequent Smith decision, which explicitly adopted the Lee
15 See Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA, supra note 103, at 183-84; Pepper, supra note 103,
at 324-25.
116 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). Justice Stevens argued
that this rule is exactly what the Court applied in Lee and many previous free exercise cases.
Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 & n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 880.
118 See supra notes 108, 114 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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standard in almost all instances, would make such a challenge quixotic. The
more fruitful ground for a free exercise claim is therefore under RFRA 0itself,
which explicitly establishes a substantial burden/strict scrutiny standard.12
III. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT

Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 in
reaction to the Smith decision. Although originally intended to apply to all free
exercise of religion challenges to governmental action, the Supreme Court
limited its application to the federal government.' 2' Despite its name, both the
statutory language and legislative history indicate that RFRA did not merely
restore the free exercise world to its pre-Smith existence with respect to the
federal government. RFRA instead imposed a less demanding (for claimants)
and less flexible (for courts) standard for judging free exercise challenges.
This Article concludes that applying this standard to the prohibition as applied
in the sermon context will, for some houses of worship and their leaders,
substantially burden the exercise of religion and thus trigger RFRA's version
of strict scrutiny. Once triggered, the government probably will not be able to
carry its burden of demonstrating that the prohibition as applied in this context
is the least restrictive means for furthering a compelling governmental interest
- as RFRA requires - for the reasons detailed below.
A.

The Statute

Scholars almost uniformly criticize the Smith decision. 22 Members of
Congress quickly and almost uniformly adopted this position as well, calling
loudly for legislation to "reverse the disastrous effects of a dastardly and
120 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2006).
121 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 &
n.1 (2006) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). The Supreme Court
appeared to assume the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government. Id.
Even if there is a constitutional question regarding RFRA's application to the federal
government, it is unclear who would raise this issue as neither plaintiffs seeking to invoke
RFRA's protection nor the federal government would be likely to do so.
122See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 2;
McConnell, supra note 85. But see, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise
Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 247 (1991)
(defending "Smith's abandonment of Sherbert," but not all of the reasons provided for the
decision); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992) (arguing that late
eighteenth-century Americans generally did not view the Free Exercise Clause as creating
religious exemptions to civil laws, thereby implicitly providing support for the result in
Smith); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 308, 308-09 (1991) (defending the outcome, but not the reasoning, in Smith). See
generally James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclast Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 & n. 15 (citing sixteen law review
articles and notes discussing Smith, of which fifteen condemned the holding).
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unprovoked attack on our first freedom by the Supreme Court of the United
States."' 23 Yet even in the midst of this firestorm of criticism, Congress did
not quickly push through drafted legislation, 124 but instead held hearings and
conducted debates for several years before ultimately approving the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.125 This passage of time provided Congress
with an opportunity to consider and make a number of significant changes to
the Act before enacting it into law.
The heart of RFRA in its current form is the following provision:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
26
governmental interest. 1
The phrase "exercise of religion" was originally defined by reference to the
First Amendment, but Congress amended that provision in 2000 to incorporate
by reference the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA") definition, 127 which provides in relevant part: "[t]he term
'religious exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled
by, or central to, a system of religious belief."' 28 The reason for this
amendment was to clarify "that the burdened religious activity need not be
compulsory or central to a religious belief system as a condition for the
123 137 CONG. REC. 17,035-36 (1991) (remarks of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz introducing the
1991 version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
124 See Berg, supra note 103, at 15-16 (describing the policy concerns and political
developments that delayed the enactment of RFRA).
125 See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1992: Hearingon S. 2969 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1, 1-7 (1992); Religious Freedom RestorationAct of
1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1, 7-10 (1992); Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1st Cong. 2, 7-27 (1990).
126 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (2006).
127 Compare Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 5(4),

107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993) (original version), with Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 7(a), 114 Stat. 803, 806
(2000) (amendment).
128Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5(7)(A).
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claim."' 129 For reasons discussed below, many houses of worship have leaders
who deliver sermons that both qualify as religious exercise under this
definition and violate the political campaign intervention prohibition. 30 The
next sections explore the meaning of the other key provisions in RFRA, which
are based at least in part on the pre-Smith individual free exercise case law.
B.

Substantial Burden

The initial RFRA bills only required that a government action "burden" the
exercise of religion to trigger RFRA's protection,' 31 in contrast to the

"substantial" or "undue" burden language used in post-Sherbert/pre-Smith
Court decisions. 32 Nevertheless, the relevant committee reports consistently
used "substantial burden" and the Senate eliminated any suggestion that the
lack of the word "substantial" indicated a lower threshold for free exercise
claims than existed pre-Smith by adding "substantial" as a modifier. 133 In
doing so, the supporters of this change explicitly stated their intent to invoke
the same requirement that the courts had applied pre-Smith. 134 Courts have
therefore generally and correctly agreed that they should look toward the preSmith definition of "substantial burden" when applying this RFRA

requirement.

129

35

H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 13 (1999); see also Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072,

1074 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the 2000 amendments "extended the protections of
RFRA to 'any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A))).
130 See infra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
131See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. 578, 103d Cong. § 3 (1993);
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1992, S. 2969, 102d Cong. § 3 (1992); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. § 3 (1991).
132 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (using the term
"substantial"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("A regulation neutral on its
face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.").
133 See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8-9 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
1898 (recognizing that pre-Smith case law required a substantial burden to trigger the
compelling interest test); H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6-7 (1993) ("It is the Committee's
expectation that the courts will look to free exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith
for guidance in determining whether or not religious exercise has been burdened .... ").
134 139 CONG. REc. 26,178-80 (1993) (statements of Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Hatch).
135 E.g., Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008); Goodall v.
Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Navajo Nation v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069-70, 1074 n.16 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (limiting the
definition of "substantial burden" under RFRA to the burdens imposed in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009); Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Goehring
v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1996); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir.
1996).
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1. Defining "Substantial Burden"
The Supreme Court first discussed the burden requirement in the free
exercise context when it decided a case involving Orthodox Jewish business
owners forced by Pennsylvania law to close their stores on Sunday. Although
the Court did not find the burden to violate the Constitution, it stated that "[i]f
the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is
constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect." 136 Relying on this definition, the Court concluded in Sherbert
that the denial of unemployment benefits based on the claimant's refusal to
work on her Sabbath violated the Constitution because it
forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts
of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free
as would a fine imposed against appellant for her
exercise of religion
137
Saturday worship.
The Court later clarified that the burden had to be substantial, first by
suggesting that the "pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior"' 138 had to
be "substantial"'' 39 and then by explicitly stating that "[t]he free exercise
inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the
observation of a central religious belief or practice." 140 The Court has also
determined "that indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion,
not just outright prohibitions" may create a substantial burden.' 41 This
standard has not been without its critics, particularly with respect to the
centrality requirement. 42 These concerns may explain why Congress revised
the RFRA definition of "exercise of religion" in 2000 to provide explicitly that
such exercise need not be "central to

...a

system of religious belief."' 143 Other

than this change, however, Congress intended that RFRA's substantial burden

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
137Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
138 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
136

139Id.

14oHernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); see also Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) ("[U]nder the Sherbert test, governmental actions that
substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest.").
14'Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988).
142 See, e.g., Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 99, at 959 (arguing that centrality
carries a "grave risk of bias toward Western, monotheistic religions").
"I Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5(7)(A) (2006); see also id. § 2000bb-2(4) (incorporating this definition into RFRA by
reference).
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requirement be the same as the requirement that existed in the pre-Smith case
law.
It is therefore clear that denying a person or institution the ability to follow
144
his, her, or its religious beliefs without exception is a substantial burden.
What is less clear is whether causing an individual or organization to bear a
significant additional economic burden as a cost of observing a religious belief
or practice is sufficient to create a substantial burden. For example, in the
Sherbert line of cases, the Supreme Court concluded that denying a worker
unemployment compensation for refusing to work on his Sabbath constitutes a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. 45 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court and various federal appellate courts have concluded that other
types of financial burdens imposed by law upon the free exercise of religious
beliefs do not reach the level of a substantial burden. For example, as
discussed above, the Supreme Court concluded that the financial burden a
Sunday closing law placed on Orthodox Jewish business owners who were
religiously compelled to be closed on Saturday was not sufficient to violate the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause even pre-Smith. 146 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit concluded under RFRA that no substantial burden exists when a
local government refuses to pay for speech services for a child attending a
private sectarian school even though the government would have provided
147
those services for free if the child had attended public school.
The distinction between these various cases appears to be how closely an
indirect financial burden is tied to the exercise of religious belief. In the
unemployment benefits cases, such as Sherbert, the state imposed the financial
penalty specifically because of the unemployed individual's religiously
compelled practice - not working on the Sabbath. In contrast, in Braunfeld,
the state did not penalize Orthodox Jewish business owners specifically for
closing their businesses on Saturday. Those owners lost the income they

I" See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc) ("Under RFRA, 'substantial burden' is imposed only when individuals are forced
to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental
benefit (Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or
criminal sanctions (Yoder)."), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009); United States v. Friday,
525 F.3d 938, 947-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding that limiting a Native American's access
to eagle feathers required for a religious ceremony would substantially burden his exercise
of religion under RFRA, but not deciding whether requiring a permit to obtain eagle feathers
constituted a substantial burden), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
115 See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989).
146 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961).
"I Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
that the plaintiffs had "neither been compelled to engage in conduct proscribed by their
religious beliefs, nor have they been forced to abstain from any action which their religion
mandates that they take" by the denial of the government benefit). The Fourth Circuit
issued this decision before the Supreme Court limited the application of RFRA to the federal
government. See id. at 168; supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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would have earned from being open on Sunday, but being open on Sunday was
not religiously compelled (although as a practical matter, income from Sunday
would offset income lost from being closed on Saturday). Regardless of
whether one agrees with this distinction, it does provide a way of reconciling
the most directly applicable Supreme Court and appellate precedents.
The distinction of how closely tied an indirect financial burden is to
religious exercise does not, however, explain all of those precedents. As
recognized by Congress when it enacted RFRA, the Court arguably found a
substantial burden to be lacking in two cases where it appeared that the
religiously-motivated conduct was substantially limited or even barred. 148 In
Bowen v. Roy, the Court found no substantial burden on the free exercise of
religion from the government's use of a child's social security number even
though the Court accepted the parents' assertion that such use would impair the
child's spiritual development. 149 Similarly, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, the Court found that the government's decision to
complete road construction and permit timber harvesting on national forest
land would impose no substantial burden, yet accepted the claimants' assertion
that doing so would destroy their ability to engage in religious ceremonies on
sacred land.' 50
Despite the Supreme Court's subsequent assertions that Roy and Lyng rested
on substantial burden grounds, 151 a close reading of the cases strongly suggests
that in both instances the Court relied primarily on an alternate ground, albeit
one that did not fit the substantial burden/strict scrutiny form of analysis. In
both cases, the Court's statements indicate that it believed neither claim
presented a Free Exercise Clause violation because the government was
operating in an area of particular federal concern and control - administration
of the social security system and use of public lands, respectively - and its
actions did not force or even pressure the religiously observant plaintiffs to act
in violation of their beliefs. In Roy, the Court stated:
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with
the religious beliefs of particular citizens ....

The Free Exercise Clause

affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental

148 See 139 CONG. REc. 26,415-16 (1993) (colloquy between Sen. Charles Grassley and
Sen. Orrin Hatch) (addressing whether RFRA would affect the holdings in Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693 (1986), and Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988), and Senator Hatch's statement that RFRA would not affect either case because the
Supreme Court found, in both cases, that the impact on exercise of religion was incidental
and not a burden).
149 Roy, 476 U.S. at 700-0 1.
0 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
"' E.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 & n.2 (1990).
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compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct
52
of the Government's internal procedures.
Similarly, in Lyng, the Court cited this passage from Roy and then went on
to state: "[i]n neither case, however, would the affected individuals be coerced
by the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would
either governmental action penalize religious activity by denying any person
an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other
citizens."' 153 The Court also may have been motivated in part by the fact that
the government had already gone
to significant lengths to try to accommodate
54
the beliefs at issue in this case.'
Thus, while the Court seemed compelled to follow the substantial
burden/strict scrutiny analysis, the underlying rationale appears to have been
based on a different set of concerns: specifically, the government's ability to
control its own internal activities - particularly with respect to land it
unquestionably owned - when those activities did not pressure the plaintiffs to
violate their beliefs (even though the government's actions may have been an
affront to those beliefs). The RFRA committee reports appear to acknowledge
this point. The House Judiciary Committee report provides that RFRA's
requirements apply to "[alll governmental actions which have a substantial
external impact on the practice of religion."' 155 Similarly, the Senate Judiciary
Committee cites Roy and Lyng for the proposition that "strict scrutiny does not
apply to government actions involving only management of internal
Government affairs or the use of the Government's own property or
resources."' 156 A correct reading of these cases therefore indicates that even if
they are relevant to the application of RFRA's substantial burden requirement,
they are not applicable in the political campaign intervention prohibition
context because the government's action clearly goes beyond management of
its own internal affairs and in fact reaches into the internal activities of houses
57
of worship. 1

152

Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700.

151Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448-49.

I"' See id. at 443, 454 (recognizing government efforts to protect both archeological and
religious sites).
"' H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993) (emphasis added).
156S.REP. No. 103-111, at 9 & n.19 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
1898. But see Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA, supra note 103, at 189-90 (arguing that the

apparent congressional support for Roy and Lyng can only be explained by a combination of
congressional confusion and an "insensitivity to Native American faiths").
"I The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, has rejected this interpretation of Roy and Lyng,
but it acknowledged that a substantial burden would exist if individuals are "forced to
choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a government
benefit .... Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
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It should be noted that the Court's resolution of these cases was not
necessarily improper, even if somewhat disingenuous, because the entire
substantial burden/strict scrutiny structure is nothing more than a courtdeveloped analytical tool to implement the language of the Free Exercise
Clause. That tool may be modified or even abandoned if the Supreme Court
concludes, as it did both pre-Smith and in Smith, that applying it in a particular
context does not ultimately match the requirements of the Free Exercise
Clause.
In the context of RFRA, however, the courts lack the flexibility to
manipulate the substantial burden requirement to foreclose a free exercise
claim on grounds that do not follow the RFRA-required substantial
58
burden/compelling governmental interest/least restrictive means structure.
Moreover, even if they had that flexibility, the courts generally have not used a
strained definition of substantial burden to reject free exercise claims to federal
tax law. 159 Therefore, a house of worship challenging the prohibition on
RFRA grounds can meet this requirement simply by demonstrating that a
burden exists and is substantial under the standard of Sherbert and later preSmith decisions.
2. The Burden on Houses of Worship
For at least some houses of worship, it is relatively easy to demonstrate that
the prohibition will burden the "exercise of religion," as defined under RFRA.
Many religious faiths, perhaps all, view the transmission of a holistic
worldview that impacts all aspects of their adherents' lives as an integral part
of their mission. 160 Therefore it would not be surprising to find that some
houses of worship believe instructing their congregations with respect to
58 Judges may also feel less pressure to engage in such manipulation.

Under RFRA,

Congress can correct any incorrect or undesirable consequences of a court's interpretation of

the statute.

See generally Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious

Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1465 (1999) (discussing how both RFRA and state law
versions of RFRA implement a "common-law exemption model" by permitting courts to
develop exemptions, while leaving legislatures with the final authority over the scope of
such exemptions).
9 See supra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
160 See,

e.g., U.S.

CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

(2d ed.

2000) para. 2032 ("To the Church belongs the right always and everywhere to announce
moral principles, including those pertaining to the social order, and to make judgments on
any human affairs to the extent that they are required by the fundamental rights of the
human person or the salvation of souls" (citation omitted)); THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER
AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SACRAMENTS AND OTHER RITES AND CEREMONIES OF THE

CHURCH 855 (U.S. version 1979) (stating that lay members of the U.S. Episcopal Church are
"to represent Christ and his Church; to bear witness to him wherever they may be; and,
according to the gifts given them, to carry on Christ's work of reconciliation in the world");
id. at 856 (one of the roles an Episcopal priest is "to represent Christ and his Church,
particularly as pastor to the people").
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political involvement to be as important to their religious teaching as
instructing them on personal relationships or finances.16' Thus, the prohibition
undoubtedly burdens the exercise of religion by some individual religious
leaders and their houses of worship.
The more difficult question is whether that burden is substantial. The most
commonly cited reason for why the prohibition is not a substantial burden is
that houses of worship have another way of engaging in the prohibited speech
- creating a non-charitable, but closely related affiliate - albeit without the use
of tax-deductible funds. 62 To understand this alternate channel reasoning
requires consideration of a Supreme Court case relating to the constitutionality
of another restriction on charities - the limitation on their lobbying activities
also found in Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3). That limitation
requires that "no substantial part of the activities" of a charity be "carrying on

propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation." 163 In Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington, a charity challenged this
lobbying limitation as an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of taxdeductible contributions under the free speech clause of the First
Amendment. 164 While the Supreme Court agreed that "the government may
161See, e.g., Letter from Most Reverend Michael J. Sheridan, Bishop of Colorado

Springs, A Pastoral Letter to the Catholic Faithful of the Diocese of Colorado Springs on the
Duties of Catholic Politicians and Voters (May 1, 2004), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/pastoral-letter--may2004.pdf
(stating
"[w]e
cannot allow the progress that has been made to be reversed by a pro-abortion President,
Senate or House of Representatives" and "[a]ny Catholics who vote for candidates who
stand for abortion, illicit stem cell research or euthanasia" will "place themselves outside
full communion with the Church and so jeopardize their salvation."); Regas, supra note 4
(encouraging parishioners making voting decisions to consider the horrors of the Iraq war
and conservatives' dismantling of social programs); supra notes 61-63 and accompanying
text (discussing evidence from surveys that a significant number of clergy in major U.S.
denominations feel it is part of their religious role to endorse candidates from the pulpit).
162See Ward L. Thomas & Judith E.Kindell, Affiliations Among Political,Lobbying and
Educational Organizations, in EXEMPT

ORGANIZATIONS

CONTINUING

PROFESSIONAL

EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 255, 259 (1999),

available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopics00.pdf (listing the requirements for
charities creating non-charitable affiliates: separate legal organization; separate financial
records and bank accounts; and allocation of time between the organizations for any shared
officers, directors, employees, goods, services, and facilities); Miriam Galston, Campaign
Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 100, 113-17 (2007)
(discussing the non-charitable affiliate option); Tobin, supra note 14, at 1325-26; see also
Benjamin M. Leff, "Sit Down and Count the Cost": A Frameworkfor Constitutionally
Enforcing the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REv. 673, 687-95 15-23
(2009) (discussing how the political intervention ban may violate the Constitution).
163I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); see also id. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii)(iii), 2522(a)(2), 2522(b)(2)-(3) (all incorporating the same limitation by reference to I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3)).
161Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983).
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not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right,"' 65 it
concluded that all Congress had done was prohibit the charity from using a
government "subsidy" in the form of tax-deductible contributions for lobbying
use. 166 It also noted that the charity still had the ability to engage in an
unlimited amount of lobbying with non-deductible funds by creating an
affiliated tax-exempt entity under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(4), as
it had apparently done previously, and that being required to create and operate
167
such an affiliate was not "unduly burdensome."'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, viewed the ability to engage in unlimited lobbying through a taxexempt affiliate as critical for sustaining the constitutionality of the lobbying
limitation. 68 He emphasized that "any significant restriction on this channel
of communication [the non-charitable affiliate], however, would negate the
saving effect of § 501(c)(4)."' 69 He therefore stated that the ability to create
such an affiliate resolved the constitutional problem only because the IRS
imposed minimal requirements, specifically that such an affiliate be separately
incorporated and maintain sufficient financial records to demonstrate that taxdeductible funds were not used to pay for lobbying. 70 In Justice Blackmun's
view, any attempt by the IRS to limit the control that a charity could exercise
over the lobbying of its section 501(c)(4)
affiliate would render the First
1
Amendment concerns "insurmountable." 71
Normally the views expressed in a concurring opinion are of limited to no
weight. However, in later decisions the Court adopted Justice Blackmun's
reasoning as that of the full Court. As documented in greater detail by
Professor Miriam Galston, in both FCC v. League of Women Voters172 and
165
166

Id.
Id. at 544 (identifying both tax exemption and the tax deductibility of contributions as

subsidies); id. at 546 (concluding, in reliance on an earlier case in which the Court upheld
the denial of a business expense deduction for lobbying expenditures against constitutional
challenge, that the First Amendment does not require Congress to subsidize lobbying).
167 Id. at 544 n.6. The Court used this point to distinguish an earlier case, Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), where it had applied the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions to a state law that required an organization to sign a loyalty declaration as a
condition for receiving property tax exemption. Id. at 545 (citing Speiser). Taxation with
Representation therefore represents a specific application of the much broader
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
article. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L.

REv. 1413 (1989) (explaining that under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the
government may not give a benefit on the condition that a recipient surrender a
constitutional right).
168 Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
169

Id. at 553.

170 Id.
171 Id.

172 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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Rust v. Sullivan, 73 the Court cited the ability of charities to easily create
lobbying affiliates as key to the Court's conclusion in Taxation with
Representation that the lobbying limitation survives scrutiny under the First
174 This line of cases set the stage for the Branch Ministries
Amendment.
175
decision.
Branch Ministries, a church, purchased full-page advertisements in two
newspapers shortly before the 1992 presidential election. 76 The ads urged
177
Christians not to vote for candidate Bill Clinton on various moral grounds.
The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of the church in 1995 based solely on
these advertisements.1 78 Branch Ministries then filed suit challenging the
IRS's action under the free exercise of religion provisions of both the First
Amendment and RFRA. 179 Addressing these claims together, the D.C. Circuit
found that for Branch Ministries to sustain its claim under either the
constitutional or the statutory provision, it had to establish that the political
campaign prohibition intervention substantially burdened its free exercise
right. 80 The court found that Branch Ministries had failed to make this
demonstration for three reasons. First, it found that Branch Ministries did not
assert that its withdrawal from electoral politics would violate its beliefs and so
the only harm it might suffer would be a decrease in funds, which the court
found to be constitutionally insignificant.' 8' Second, it found that revocation
was "more symbolic than substantial" because Branch Ministries could easily
reclaim its tax-exempt and deductible contribution status simply by renouncing
future involvement in political campaigns. 82 Third and finally, it found that as
in Taxation with Representation, Branch Ministries could easily create a

section 501(c)(4) affiliate to engage in political campaign intervention using
non-deductible funds. 83 The court concluded that since Branch Ministries had
not demonstrated that the prohibition imposed a substantial burden on its free
exercise rights, the court did not have to reach the issue of whether the

U.S. 173 (1991).
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-98; League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-400;
Galston, supra note 162, at 116-17 (noting that several district and appellate courts have
also reached this conclusion).
175 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that
revocation of church's tax-exempt status was constitutional).
173 500
174

176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 140-41.

'10 Id. at 142.
1"IId. The opinion does not clearly state the basis for its determination that requiring
Branch Ministries to withdraw from electoral politics would not violate the organization's
religious beliefs. Id.
182 Id. at 142-43.
183

Id. at 143.
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prohibition met the standards for burdening those rights under either the First
Amendment or RFRA. 184 The appellate court's conclusion as to the third point
is not surprising given the Taxation with Representation line of cases. On its
face, it would appear that this analysis should foreclose any challenge to the
prohibition as applied to a sermon, but there is a strong argument that inservice sermons are distinguishable from the newspaper ads in Branch
85

Ministries.1

Assume there is a pastor who believes that certain candidates in an
upcoming election are supporting policies that are fundamentally at odds with
her faith's religious beliefs. Further, assume that she believes that if members
of her faith vote for such candidates, those members are placing themselves at
risk of eternal damnation. She therefore believes that as their pastor, she has a
religious duty to warn those members in her congregation about this risk, and
the other leaders of her house of worship agree. This is not just a hypothetical
situation; it is almost certain that there are many religious leaders and houses
86
of worship with these views. 1
If these are the only facts of this hypothetical, there is a strong argument that
the availability of the non-charitable affiliate will render any burden the
prohibition might place on the pastor as less than substantial. For example, if
she chooses to communicate this message via a pastoral letter to her
congregation, the only related costs would be the cost for the time she spends
composing the letter, the cost of mailing it, and a fair rental cost for access to

Id. at 144.
185 It may, however, foreclose a free speech challenge in this context because the unique
184

nature of sermons arises from their religious significance, not their particular mode of
speech, and it is certainly possible for a non-charitable affiliate to stage an event where a
religious leader gives an in-person speech even if that speech is separate from the house of
worship's regular worship service. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981) (concluding in the context of a time, place, and manner
restriction that religious organizations do not enjoy any greater First Amendment rights than
other organizations, even though the particular restriction at issue impeded a specific
religious ritual); id. at 659 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that the plaintiffs appeared to rest their claims solely on the Free Speech Clause, but that the
majority chose to discuss the religious ritual involved without giving it any greater
protection than that provided to speech generally). Partly for this reason, consideration of a
free speech challenge to the prohibition is beyond the scope of this article.
186 See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text. An ABC News story described a
situation almost exactly matching these facts. Russell Goldman, Pastors Challenge Law,
Endorse
Candidates from
Pulpit,
ABC
NEWS,
June
20,
2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=5 198068&page= 1 (reporting that Pastor
Gus Booth of the Warroad Community Church in Minnesota told his congregation in May
2008 that God wanted them to vote Republican in a sermon approved by his church's
leadership and with full knowledge that the sermon violated the federal tax laws). Pastor
Booth also wrote the IRS describing his sermon and challenging them to respond. Id.
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the house of worship's mailing list. 187 As the appellate court held in Branch
Ministries, the mere fact that these costs, all directly associated with political
campaign intervention, would have to be paid for by a non-charitable affiliate
with non-deductible funds does not impose a substantial burden on the free
88
exercise rights of the pastor or her house of worship.1
What if, however, under the tenets of the pastor's faith, the best and perhaps
only way to communicate such an important message is through her sermons
during the regular, in-person gatherings of the congregation? This is not a
purely hypothetical situation. In most, if not all, major faith traditions there is

a high and possibly unique importance given to the in-person gathering of
believers. 189 Furthermore, many faith traditions view teaching or preaching

See Thomas & Kindell, supra note 162, at 259 (recognizing that affiliated § 501(c)(3)
and § 501(c)(4) organizations must reasonably allocate staff time and other shared
resources); id. at 265 (reasoning that use of a § 501(c)(3) organization's mailing list may not
be on a preferential or a non-arm's length basis).
"8 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
189 For discussion of in-person gatherings in Christian traditions, see, for example, Acts
2:46, 4:31 (describing meetings of members of the early Christian church); 2 WILLIAM
BARCLAY, THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW, 190 (rev. ed. 1975) (explaining that one interpretation
of Matthew 18:20 is as the in-person gathering of the Church); THE BOOK OF COMMON
187

PRAYER AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SACRAMENTS AND OTHER RiTES AND CEREMONIES OF

856 (U.S. version 1979) (stating as part of the Church's Catechism that "[tihe
duty of all Christians is ...to come together week by week for corporate worship"); THE
62 (1996) (stating that under
BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH
Article XIII of the Articles of Religion of the Methodist Church "[t]he visible church of
Christ is a congregation of faithful men in which the pure Word of God is preached, and the
Sacraments duly administered"); Matthew 18:20 (Jesus's statement that "[flor where two or
three come together in my name, there am I with them"); U.S. CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra
note 160, para. 2177 ("The Sunday celebration of the Lord's Day and his Eucharist is at the
heart of the Church's life."); id. para. 2178 ("The Letter to the Hebrews reminds the faithful
,not to neglect to meet together, as is the habit of some, but to encourage one another."'
(quoting Hebrews 10:25)); JOHN WESLEY, WESLEY'S NOTES ON THE BIBLE 418 (Zondervan
available at http://wesley.nnu.edu/john-wesley/notes/matthew.htm
1987),
Corp.
(interpreting Matthew 18:20 to mean gathered together to worship Jesus Christ). For
discussion of the Islamic significance of in-person gatherings, see, for example, C.H.
Becker, On the History of Muslim Worship, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC RITUAL 49,
49-74 (Gerald Hawting, ed. 2006) (describing the development and variations among the
Friday service observed by Muslims). For discussion of in-person gatherings and Judaism,
see, for example, A.Z. IDELSOHN, JEWISH LITURGY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT xv-xix (1960)
(describing the structure and history of Jewish services). See also Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, Dec. 2000, art. 10 (using almost identical language to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, quoted infra); Concluding Document from
the Vienna Conference, Jan. 19, 1989, art. 16(d) (stating that the participating states will
"respect the fight of religious communities to establish and maintain freely accessible places
of worship or assembly"); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
THE CHURCH
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about moral truths during in-person gatherings of believers to be one of the
most important functions of houses of worship and religious leaders. 190
Sermons are therefore, at least for some faith traditions and houses of worship,
a distinct, religiously significant means of communication. 19 1 Thus, the
religious belief that teaching during such gatherings is at the heart of a house
of worship's religious mission strongly supports the view that forcing a
message to be communicated by a house of worship through other means
constitutes a substantial burden on free exercise of religion.
The effect of the prohibition, at least for some houses of worship, is
therefore not only to prevent the communication of a candidate-related
message, but to prevent that communication through the religiously motivated
method of a sermon or other teaching during an in-person gathering of
believers. This effect is legally significant for two reasons. First, the IRS has
stated that any communication that is made through an "official" channel of a
charity violates the prohibition, regardless of the source of funds that pay for
that communication. 192 Second, even if this were not the case, commentators
on all sides of this issue have generally agreed that it is virtually impossible to
distinguish the cost of a political sermon from other costs associated with a
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance." (emphasis added)).
"9 See, e.g., MARK DEVER & PAUL ALEXANDER, THE DELIBERATE CHURCH 98 (2005)
(stating that biblical exposition for the mutual edification of believers is primary for the
regular Sunday morning worship service, and indeed that such exposition is "the centerpiece
not only of this service, but of the entire public ministry of the Word"); The Second Helvetic
Confession, in THE BOOK OF CONFESSIONS 51, 94-95 (Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 2002)
(dating from 1561 and still adhered to by the Presbyterian Church (USA), it provides that
one of the two duties of a minister is "to gather together an assembly for worship in which
to expound God's Word"); U.S. CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 160, paras. 81, 84-87, 132,
1100, 1349 (noting the critical role of the homily as "an exhortation to accept this Word as
what it truly is, the Word of God, and to put it into practice" (citation omitted)); Becker,
supra note 189, at 50 (explaining that in Islam the sermon (khutba in Arabic) is now an
integral part of the regular Friday celebration); Most Reverend Donald W. Wuerl, The Role
of Priests in Catechesis in the New Millennium, in PRIESTS FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM (U.S.

Catholic Conference Inc. 2000) 113, 123 ("[T]he preaching of the priest is his first and
principal means of exercising his prophetic office in the Church.... The pulpit will retain
its privileged position for the priest. It is from here that Sunday after Sunday we have an
opportunity to directly touch our people in a way that nothing else we do can.").
191In contrast to, for example, selling t-shirts with a religious message. See Henderson
v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting a RFRA challenge to
regulations barring the sale of t-shirts on the National Mall in part because the claimants had
a multitude of other means of communicating their religious methods, including selling
t-shirts at a different location); Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(observing that the plaintiffs' "declarations do not suggest that their religious beliefs
demand that they sell t-shirts in every place human beings occupy or congregate").
192See infra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.

POLITICS AT THE PULPIT

2009]

1175

worship service. 19 3 Reliance on the alternate channel argument to support a

conclusion that the prohibition's burden in this context is not substantial is
therefore misplaced.
On the first point, the IRS has stated in precedential literature that if a
university president writes a column in the monthly alumni newsletter
endorsing a candidate, the university violates the prohibition. 94 This is
because of the official nature of the newsletter; even if the president both
identifies the endorsement as his personal views and personally pays for the
column's costs, there is still a violation. 95 The IRS has also provided a
parallel example in a publication for churches, by substituting a minister for
the president, the minister's church for the university, and a member newsletter
for the alumni newsletter. 96 The IRS's discussion of this example strongly
indicates that the IRS would view a political sermon by a religious leader to be
an official communication of her house of worship and a violation of the
prohibition, regardless of whether the leader identified the views expressed as
those of a non-charitable affiliate and the affiliate paid for any costs associated
with delivering the message. 197 This interpretation of the prohibition is
certainly reasonable, as it is difficult to see how a statement in the middle of
the service - "and now for a message from the House of Worship Action
Fund" - could be effectively disassociated from the house of worship
regardless of what entity paid the associated costs.198 The burden placed on a
house of worship that sincerely believes its leaders must deliver a political
sermon is therefore not only the burden of having to pay for the sermon with

See Caron & Dessingue, supra note 14, at 193 (concluding that "[t]here is no practical
means by which [certain church activities] can be delegated to a section 501(c)(4) affiliate"
and giving "teaching and preaching functions that normally take place during worship
services" as an example); Gaffney, supra note 14, at 35 (concluding that "section 501(c)(4)
is of no practical use to a preacher who cannot be required to announce at the beginning of a
sermon whether he is speaking for a 501(c)(3) church or a 501(c)(4) clone, let alone to
switch birettas or yarmulkes in the midst of such a sermon"); Leff, supra note 162, at 680
(citing the congressional testimony of an IRS official who asked, rhetorically, "[f]or
example, what is the expenditure related to an endorsement of a candidate during a sermon
from the pulpit" (footnote omitted)); Tobin, supra note 14, at 1325 (concluding that the noncharitable affiliate of a house of worship simply "cannot preach during services, and it
cannot use the power of the pulpit to tell people how to vote"). But see Leff, supra note
162, at 717-21 (proposing a solution for this allocation problem).
19' Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421, 1422.
193

195 Id.
196 IRS,

TAX

GUIDE,

supra note 35, at 8.

197 See id. For criticism of this attribution approach to the political campaign
intervention prohibition, see Leff, supra note 162, at 696-704, 712-13, 728-29.
198See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-08-050 (Feb. 20, 2009) (concluding that political
messages that appeared on a webpage bearing a charity's banner and logo would be
attributed to the charity even though a non-charitable affiliate paid for the costs of the
webpage and the affiliate's logo appeared below the charity's banner).
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non-deductible funds, but also of having to surrender the house of worship's
ability to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions for any purpose. Such
a burden could be quite substantial, at least for a house of worship that is able
to demonstrate that a significant amount of its contributions come from donors
who would reduce the amount of their donations if the charitable contribution
deduction was unavailable. There is also an additional complication that even
if the IRS permitted the non-charitable affiliate to pay for the value of access to
the congregation during the regular worship service, the IRS has indicated that
such access cannot be provided on a preferential basis. 199 Rather, access must
be made generally available to the public at the same cost - something almost
200
all houses of worship presumably would find highly problematic.
Even if the IRS were to abandon both its official communication approach
and its no preferential access requirement, houses of worship and the IRS
would still face the difficult task of determining how much an affiliate would
have to pay in order to protect a house of worship from the loss of its ability to
receive tax-deductible contributions. Reasonable views of the appropriate cost
could range from the cost of the pastor's time spent preparing the sermon and
some type of fair rental value for the use of the house of worship's service
location, sound system, and so on, to all of the costs associated with that
particular service since the congregation would not be there to hear the
political sermon if those expenditures were not made, to all of the costs
incurred by the house of worship for attracting individuals to attend its services
generally.2 01 Unless the IRS were to accept an allocation that only required
minimal costs to be paid by a non-charitable affiliate - which would
effectively eviscerate the prohibition - houses of worship would therefore
likely be required to use non-deductible funds to pay for some portion of their
202
activities that otherwise could be paid for with deductible funds.
However, requiring a house of worship to use non-deductible funds to pay
for any significant amount of its other religious activities would impose a
substantial burden on exercise of religion under RFRA. It is true that the
Supreme Court has found burdens on the exercise of religion to be
unsubstantial when the individual adherents to a faith only had less money to
spend on their religious activities because of a general tax rule applicable to a

"I See Thomas & Kindell, supra note 162, at 265 (stating that a charity should not
subsidize any political intervention activity of an affiliate by, inter alia, granting preferential
access to the charity's mailing list).
200

Id.

201 For

a thoughtful analysis of this problem and possible solutions, see Leff, supra note
162, at 715-28. For the reasons detailed in this Section, however, any cost allocation
attempt that does not eviscerate the prohibition does not resolve the substantial burden
problem.
202 See Leff, supra note 162, at 704-08 (criticizing such "marginal cost" approaches).
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specific activity, whether sales of printed material or payments for training. 20 3
The difference here is that the government is imposing the cost by refusing a
benefit - the charitable contribution deduction - for an undoubtedly religious
activity of a regular in-person gathering of believers because a portion of that
gathering includes a prohibited message. The political sermon situation is
therefore similar to the Sherbert line of unemployment benefits cases, where
the religiously motivated refusal to accept certain jobs created a substantial
burden when it resulted in the denial of benefits for which the individual was
otherwise eligible. 2°4 Here the house of worship is being required to choose
between religiously motivated expression through a means of communication
chosen for religious reasons and an increased financial burden, not only with
respect to that communication, but also to other religious activities that would
otherwise not bear this burden. This renders the otherwise unsubstantial
burden of creating a non-charitable affiliate to ensure the prohibited activity is

203 See

Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990)

(stating that in the context of a state sales collection and withholding requirement, the
imposition of a generally applicable tax is not a constitutionally significant burden simply
because it reduces the amount of money to spend on religious activity); Hernandez v.
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (finding that the only burden of denying a deductible
contribution for "auditing" payments was that the adherents had less money available to
gain access to such sessions).
204 See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free
exercise is nonetheless substantial."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963).
Further support for this conclusion is found in cases under RLUIPA, where the Courts of
Appeals have indicated that conditioning a benefit on abandonment of religiously motivated
activity, including by imposing an economic burden, may result in a substantial burden.
See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir.
2007) (concluding that a substantial burden may exist if a conditional denial of a zoning
request requires modifications that "are economically unfeasible" or if such a denial leaves
open only alternatives that require "substantial delay, uncertainty, and expense");
Washington v. Klein, 497 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that the conditioning of a
benefit on an inmate's abandonment of religious conduct is sufficient to constitute a
substantial burden). But see, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago,
342 F.3d 752, 761-62 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that requiring compliance with land use
regulations, even if doing so results in significant additional expense, is not a substantial
burden under RLUIPA). Most appellate courts that have considered the question have
concluded that RLUIPA and RFRA generally apply the same definition of substantial
burden. See, e.g., Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008); Grace
United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 661 (10th Cir. 2006); DeHart
v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 275 (3d Cir. 2004). But see San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of
Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining substantial burden under
RLUIPA based on the plain meaning of the term, without reference to RFRA); Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761 (applying a RLUIPA-specific definition of
substantial burden).
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not paid for with tax-deductible funds into a substantial burden because of the
additional cost imposed by requiring that affiliate to pay for all or most of the
service costs with non-deductible funds. So even if the IRS were willing to
abandon its official communication and non-preferential access requirements,
almost any plausible cost allocation system would still impose a substantial
burden.2 05
This conclusion does not rest on the assumption that the government must,
as a constitutional matter, grant houses of worship the ability to receive taxdeductible charitable contributions to fund some or all of their religious
activities. Nor does it rest on the assumption that the government must, as a
constitutional matter, permit houses of worship to use tax-deductible charitable
contributions for all of their activities if it permits such contributions to fund
some of their activities. Rather, it rests on the conclusion that if government
chooses to grant houses of worship this tax benefit for activities other than
political campaign intervention, it places a substantial burden on the exercise
of religion by houses of worship if it withdraws that benefit based on
religiously motivated political campaign intervention that cannot be easily
20 6
distinguished from other activities.
Therefore, some houses of worship will be able to demonstrate that, at least
with respect to their sermons, the prohibition places a substantial burden on
their exercise of religion under RFRA's definition. This conclusion does not,
however, mean that these houses of worship will be exempt from the
prohibition's application to their sermons. What it means is that the
government must demonstrate that the burden is justified under RFRA's
standard.
C.

Strict Scrutiny
Under RFRA, the federal government "may substantially burden a person's
free exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

205 For similar reasons, application of the taxes imposed by I.R.C. §§ 527(0, 4955

(2006), on political activity expenditures by charities probably also impose a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion for at least some houses of worship and their leaders.
206 See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortion and Religious

Schools, 104 HARv. L. REV. 989, 1015-18 (1991) (using abortion and education as examples
and arguing that if government imposes an additional cost beyond refusing to pay the costs
of exercising a constitutional right, then a sufficient burden is placed on the exercise of that
constitutional right and the government must justify that burden). But see Nelson Tebbe,
Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1325-27 (2008) (arguing that government
should constitutionally be able, although not required, to exclude religious schools from
school voucher programs even with respect to the "secular" portion of those schools'
programs because the education at such schools is "not easily separable into secular and
sacred components").
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interest. '20 7 These two requirements necessarily relate, as the definition of the
compelling governmental interest served is critical for determining whether the
government action or rule at issue is in fact the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest, and so they will be considered together. Before
considering what compelling governmental interests may be served by the
political campaign intervention prohibition and whether the prohibition is the
least restrictive means for furthering one or more of those interests, it is
necessary to consider whether and to what extent Congress, in enacting RFRA,
departed from the pre-Smith case law regarding these requirements.
1.

What RFRA Restored and What It Changed

The title of RFRA, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, suggests that it
merely restored the legal landscape that existed before the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith. If that were so, reliance on it would prove no more fruitful
than reliance on the Free Exercise Clause. 20 8 A closer look at the history of
RFRA demonstrates that Congress did more than just reinstate the previous
law with respect to both the compelling interest and least restrictive means
requirements. This conclusion is supported by both Congress's explicit
statements and by the legislative changes that eventually resulted in the draft of
RFRA that became law.
a.

Compelling Interest

The legislative history shows that Congress sought to restore the
"compelling governmental interest test" that it believed Smith had incorrectly
eliminated for laws of general application that burdened religion. 209 That
history provides that Congress expected "that the courts will look to free
exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining
whether or not... the least restrictive means have been employed in furthering
a compelling governmental interest" 210 and that the compelling interest test
"generally should not be construed more stringently or more leniently that it
was prior to Smith. ''2 11 Both the House and Senate committee reports also
specifically listed a number of pre-Smith cases, including Lee, Bob Jones
University, and Hernandez,212 as examples213of cases where the Supreme Court
had
employed this strict scrutiny standard.

207

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2006).

208 See supra Part II.C.
209 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993), as reprintedin
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.
210 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6-7; see also S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8-9 (using almost

identical language).
211 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 7; see also S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9 (using identical
language).
212 See discussion supra Part II.C.
213 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 5 n.13; S. REP. No. 103-111, at 5 n.5 (citing identical cases).
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At the same time, however, Congress did in fact change the pre-Smith
standard, although the exact extent of that change is unclear. One change is
that Congress chose not to accept the lower level of scrutiny it concluded the
Supreme Court had applied in claims involving prisoners and members of the
military. 214 It is unclear to what extent Congress changed the application of
the compelling interest test in other contexts, as both the House and Senate
committee reports carefully stated that they neither approved nor disapproved
of the result in any particular court decision involving the free exercise of
religion, 21 5 and disclaimed even to dictate a result under the facts present in the
Smith case itself.2 16 Congress therefore left the door open for courts to
reconsider, under the RFRA compelling governmental interest test, the results
in any of the pre-Smith cases, and to reach different results if they concluded
that the pre-Smith cases did not correctly apply that standard.
Congress was not simply ignorant of the extent to which the pre-Smith cases
did not protect the free exercise of religion, as discussed above. For example,
when Senator Orrin Hatch helped introduce the 1990 version of RFRA in the
Senate, he carefully noted a number of questions that needed to be answered,
including "whether the compelling interest test has been applied in all areas of
American life prior to Smith" 217 including the military, prisons, and certain
other government programs as areas where pre-Smith decisions "suggest that a
different standard may be applicable." 2 18 He also noted, however, that "even if
the compelling interest test did not apply in particular areas prior to the Smith
decision, I and others in Congress may still feel it is desirable to extend it to
some or all such areas." 219 That appears to have been his ultimate position.
When he helped introduce both the 1992 and the 1993 versions of RFRA in the
Senate, he did not raise this issue again, even though the bills did not exclude
any areas from the compelling interest standard. 220

Rather, his position

appears to be characterized by a statement he made as part of the 1992 bill's
introduction: "A tough standard is necessary to protect religious liberty. This
bill imposes a compelling interest test on State and Federal Governments when

H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 7-8 (criticizing the holdings of O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987) and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)); S. REP. No. 103111, at 9-12; see also Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA, supra note 103, at 191-93 (explaining
that it is certain that Congress intended to impose a stricter standard in these contexts than
the Supreme Court had adopted, although how much stricter is unclear).
215 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 7; S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9.
216 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 7.
217 136 CONG. REC. 35,840, 35,841 (1990) (discussing the introduction of S. 3254).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 139 CONG. REc. 4821 (1993) (remarking on introduction of S. 578 during
214

confirmation discussions for Attorney General Janet Reno); 138 CONG. REc. 18,018 (1992)
(remarking on introduction of S. 2969).
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a governmental rule or law burdens someone's free exercise of religion."'22'
Not all members of Congress were so sanguine. Senator Alan Simpson voted
against the 1993 version of RFRA in committee because of his reservations
about applying the compelling interest standard in all contexts, although he
ultimately voted for the final bill on the Senate floor. 222 He specifically
recognized that the Supreme Court had effectively applied a lower standard
than compelling interest when addressing free exercise claims in the prison
context and was concerned that RFRA would eliminate this lower standard to
the detriment of prison administration. 223 This concern was shared by many
Senators, and became the focus of a vigorous debate that did not end until a
proposed amendment to exempt prisons from the reach of RFRA failed by a
224
vote of forty-one to fifty-eight.
The House also recognized the possibility that Congress could be enacting a
higher standard than embodied in the pre-Smith cases. As noted in the House
Judiciary Committee report, at least some members of the House of
Representatives were concerned that the legislation, as originally drafted,
might impose a more stringent standard than applied in the cases prior to
Smith, even outside of the prison and military contexts. 225 For this reason, the
House Judiciary Committee made three changes to the 1993 House version of
RFRA. First, it changed the "Purposes" section to refer to the "compelling
interest test as set forth" not only in Sherbert and Yoder, which several
committee members characterized as stating a test that "was far stronger than
the court had been applying prior to Smith" but in all of the pre-Smith federal
court cases. 226 It also changed the compelling interest requirement from a
showing that the government action was "essential to" the interest to a showing
that the action "furthers" that interest, and defined "exercise of religion" by
reference to the First Amendment. 227 However, neither the Committee's
changes to the "Purposes" section nor the definition of "exercise of religion"
have survived to today. As noted above, in 2000, Congress amended the
definition of "exercise of religion" to incorporate the broader definition found
in RLUIPA.228 As for the "Purposes" section change, the Senate Judiciary
Committee's 1993 version of RFRA, which it approved after the House

221

138 CONG. REc. 18,018 (remarking on introduction of S. 2969).

222 See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 24 (reporting Sen. Simpson's identification of himself as
the single "nay" vote in the Judiciary Committee); 139 CONG. REc. 26,414 (1993)

(identifying Senator Simpson's yea vote for the RFRA).
223 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 18-24.

224 See 139 CONG. REc. 26,407-13 (reviewing the debate); id. at 26,414 (detailing the
vote).
225 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 14 (1993).
226

Id.

227 Id.

228 See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
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229
Judiciary Committee had approved its version, did not include that change.
While it is not clear that the Senate committee was even aware of the House
committee's change, the language of the Senate committee's report indicates
that it did not share the concerns expressed by some members of the House:
"Congress also determines that the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith eliminated the compelling interest test for evaluating free
exercise claims previously set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, and that it is necessary to restore that test to preserve religious
freedom. '230 The Senate eventually passed the Senate Judiciary Committee
version, which the House then passed without commenting on or even
acknowledging the Senate's rejection of the House's change to the "Purposes"
23 1
section.
This legislative history strongly indicates that even outside of the prison and
military context, courts applying RFRA are not necessarily bound by earlier,
pre-Smith First Amendment decisions but instead must review the reasoning of
those decisions to see whether they actually employed the compelling
governmental interest test mandated by RFRA. 232 An examination of the least
restrictive means requirement that is also part of this test further supports this
conclusion.

b.

Least Restrictive Means

While the term "compelling interest" was relatively common in the preSmith free exercise cases, the term "least restrictive means" was not. As courts
and commentators have noted, to the extent that the courts referred to a
concept along these lines, they never described it as narrowly as "least
229 See S. 578, 103d Cong. § 2(b)(1)(1993).
230 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 14 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1904

(explaining the findings and purposes section of S. 578); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(2006); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2-3 (detailing the congressional findings and declaration of
purposes section of S. 578 as approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee).
231 See 139 CONG. REc. 27,239-41 (1993) (detailing discussion of Senate amendment to
House version of RFRA).
232 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 103, at 26-28 (arguing that both the text of RFRA and its
legislative history support applying the compelling governmental interest test as stated in
Sherbert and Yoder and not necessarily as implemented in later decisions); Douglas

Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 73 TEX.
L. REv. 209, 224 & n.68 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It:
Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249, 284-90 (1995). But see Lupu,
Of Time and the RFRA, supra note 103, at 196-98 (arguing that the use of "prior federal
court rulings" in the "Findings" section of RFRA at least creates some ambiguity regarding
whether Congress intended to impose the Sherbert-Yoder version of the compelling
governmental interest test). The Supreme Court has also stated generally that RFRA
"adopts a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith" but it is not
clear exactly what the Court meant by this statement. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
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It is not clear whether this change of terminology

represents a different, higher standard for the government, or merely represents
a rephrasing of the narrowly tailored requirement. The language itself would
indicate the former, as any number of means could be "narrowly tailored," but
presumably only one (or perhaps more if there is a tie) could be the "least
restrictive means." Regardless of which reading is correct, courts addressing a
RFRA challenge must squarely address this least restrictive means
requirement, as well as whether the compelling governmental interest
requirement has been met. Courts did not always address these issues in the
pre-Smith cases, even in those cases purporting to apply the compelling
governmental interest test. So while the parameters of RFRA's standard of
scrutiny for government actions or rules that substantially burden the exercise
of religion are not completely clear, courts applying this standard must
carefully consider whether both parts of the standard have been met, and
therefore should not rely solely on the conclusions of pre-Smith First
Amendment decisions. With that in mind, this Article now turns to RFRA in
the context of the political campaign intervention prohibition and religious
leaders speaking from the pulpit.
2. Applying RFRA's Version of Strict Scrutiny
The burden the prohibition places on houses of worship may further several
possible compelling governmental interests. The most obvious is cited in Lee
and Hernandez: the government's interest in maintaining a sound tax
system. 234 More specific tax-related interests include preventing avoidance of
the otherwise generally applicable tax rule that contributions and expenditures
in support of political activity are not deductible and preventing houses of
235
worship from violating the general private benefit limitation on charities.
Another commonly cited interest is protecting the government, the public, and
houses of worship themselves from the possible harm resulting from a house of
worship's involvement in politics, including the risk of corruption and the
appearance of corruption created by permitting a house of worship's resources
to be used to influence who is elected. 236 Finally, there is also an interest in

233

See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (stating that the least

restrictive means requirement "was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence"); Lupu, Of
Time and the RFRA, supra note 103, at 194-95. But see Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 424 (stating
that RFRA adopted "a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in
Smith").
234 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) ("Because the broad public interest in

maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the
payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax."); see also Hernandez v. Comm'r,
490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (relying on Lee, 455 U.S. at 257).
235 See Leff, supra note 162, at 694-95 (listing "potential governmental interests").
236 E.g., Tobin, supra note 14, at 1322-26 (explaining why intervention in political
campaigns is not in the best interest of houses of worship).
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enforcing the separation of church and state, including compliance with the
Establishment Clause. 237

A close examination of each of these interests

reveals, however, that the government will have a difficult time demonstrating
that they are compelling and that the prohibition as applied to sermons is the
least restrictive means for furthering them.
a.

Protectingthe Tax System

As previously discussed, the Supreme Court found in both Lee and
Hernandez that maintaining a sound tax system by generally barring courtcreated, religiously based exemptions was a compelling governmental interest
sufficient to justify the burden imposed on religion in each case.238 There are,
however, several reasons to believe that neither case is controlling in this
context. First, the current situation is factually distinguishable from the
situations in both Lee and Hernandez. Second, and more importantly, in
neither case did the Supreme Court apply the compelling governmental interest
test with the rigor required by RFRA's statutory language.
In both Lee and Hernandez, the Court faced a situation where an individual
refused to pay taxes otherwise owed because of a claimed substantial burden
on their religious beliefs. 239 In the current context, the tax exemption of houses
of worship is not truly the issue. As discussed previously, a house of worship
can choose to be tax-exempt under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(4)
and still be able to engage in a limited amount of political campaign
intervention. 240 The current issue is the ability of houses of worship to receive
tax-deductible contributions. 241 While the ability to receive such contributions
reduces the taxes otherwise owed by donors, any threat to the soundness of the
tax system is significantly attenuated because most donors probably do not
deduct their contributions.2 42 Moreover, a limited exception to the prohibition
237

See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th

Cir. 1972) (citing congressional interest in the separation of church and state as support for
the prohibition as applied to a religious ministry); Dessingue, supra note 14, at 917.
238 See supra notes 108, 114 and accompanying text.
239 See Lee, 455 U.S. at 254-55; Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 686.
24 See supra Part III.B.2.
241 See Douglas H. Cook, The Politically Active Church, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 457, 458
(2004) (suggesting that churches desiring to be politically active should elect to "organize
and operate as tax-exempt 'social welfare' organizations" under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4));
Michael Hatfield, Ignore the Rumors - Campaigning from the Pulpit Is Okay, 20 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 125, 128 (2006) (suggesting that churches desiring to be
politically active could become taxable entities with only a modest tax cost); Donald B.
Tobin, PoliticalAdvocacy and Taxable Entities, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 41, 42 (2007)
(discussing the legal issues raised by using taxable entities to engage in election-related
activity).
242 See Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the CharitableContribution Deduction,
42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 845-46 (2001) (concluding that "churches often bear the burden of the
electioneering prohibition without their contributors enjoying the benefit of a tax deduction"
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for occasional candidate-related messages from the pulpit during regular
worship services would involve only a small part of a house of worship's
activity. Unless a deductible donation was earmarked for that activity, only a
would be improper, further
relatively small portion of the deduction arguably
243
attenuating the potential harm to the tax system.
In the context of a religious leader delivering a sermon, or even other types
of internal house of worship communications, there seems little risk to the
federal budget, even if a candidate-related message is funded with taxdeductible contributions. For almost fifty years, the IRS barely enforced the
prohibition and never enforced it in the context of internal house of worship
communications, and the tax system still survived - despite evidence of a
significant number of violations. 244 The difficulty of demonstrating that a
limited exception to the prohibition for political sermons is a realistic threat to
the administration of the entire tax system also distinguishes the current
situation from the RFRA cases that have upheld tax-related rules based on Lee
245
and Hernandez.
An argument could be made, however, that unlike the interest in Lee and
Hernandez, the compelling governmental interest here is not maintaining the
soundness of the entire tax system, but instead preventing donors from
avoiding the long-standing rule that amounts paid for candidate-related activity
are not deductible. 246 This rule is also embodied in the taxation of otherwise
because lower-income taxpayers, who are less likely to itemize their deductions, are also the
same taxpayers who favor religious organizations when it comes to giving); Sean Marcia &
Justin Bryan, IndividualIncome Tax Returns, 2005, 27 SOI BULL. 5, 8 (reporting that almost
two-thirds of all individual tax returns filed claimed the standard deduction instead of taking
itemized deductions), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07fallbul.pdf. Tax payers
can only deduct charitable donations when itemizing their tax returns. I.R.C. §§ 26, 170
(2006).
243 See Berg, supra note 103, at 42.
244 See supra Part I.B.
245 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Comm'r, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a RFRA-based
exemption from paying federal taxes based on religious objections to military activities),
cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 129 (2007); United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d
627, 630 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a RFRA-based exemption from paying federal
employment taxes sought by a church); Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir.
1999) (concluding that RFRA did not create an exemption for an individual who refused to
pay income taxes because of her religiously motivated anti-war beliefs, but noting that
RFRA might apply differently to the IRS in other factual contexts); Droz v. Comm'r, 48
F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a requested religious exemption to social
security taxes, although it is unclear whether the court applied the First Amendment or
RFRA); United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends,
322 F. Supp. 2d 603, 613 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (finding that tax levy did not violate RFRA
because it furthered government's compelling interest in quickly and inexpensively
discharging tax deficiencies by the least restrictive means).
246 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U.
L. REv. 625, 637-39 (2007) (describing "the longstanding rule that no deduction is allowed
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tax-exempt income received by non-charitable, tax-exempt organizations that
are permitted to intervene in political campaigns; and in the denial of a
business expense deduction for political campaign expenditures made by
taxable organizations and individuals.2 47 This argument would more closely
match the language of RFRA, which requires the government to
"demonstrate[] that application of the burden to the person" at issue meets the
compelling governmental interest text.248 It also responds to the view
expressed by several commentators that the mere invocation of a very general
governmental interest is not sufficient to meet the RFRA standard. 249
The Supreme Court has in fact stated that "RFRA requires the Government
to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application
of the challenged law 'to the person' - the particular claimant whose sincere
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. '250 It recognized that in
both Sherbert and Yoder, "this Court looked beyond broadly formulated
interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and
scrutinized the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular
religious claimants. '251 The Court used this reasoning to reject an attempt by
the Government to justify a blanket ban on a hallucinogen used in certain
religious ceremonies based on a general assertion that granting any religious
exemptions would undermine the Controlled Substances Act. 252 The Court
also stated that the Lee and Hernandez cases represented situations where the
government had successfully demonstrated that granting religious
accommodations would seriously compromise the government's ability to
administer a statutory program. 253 For the reasons already stated, however, the
for expenditures for political activity"); Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer's Perspective on
Section 527 Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1773, 1776-78 (2007) (describing the
serious concerns raised if campaign contributions were "funded with pre-tax dollars"); see
also Carroll, supra note 14, at 252-53 (finding the justification "that political activity is
fundamentally inconsistent with 'charitable' status" unpersuasive); Leff, supra note 162, at

694-96.
247 See I.R.C. § 162(e); id. § 527(f).

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
See Berg, supra note 103, at 39 ("[I]t should not be enough to make generalized
assertions about effects on public safety or order."); Laycock & Thomas, supra note 232, at
222-28 ("If . . . [a] deferential view of compelling interest is read into RFRA, the
congressional goal of protecting religious practice will be wholly defeated."); Paulsen,
supra note 232, at 270-72.
250 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31
(2006) (citation omitted).
248

249

251Id. at431.
252 Id. at 423; see also Richard W. Garnett & Joshua D. Dunlap, Taking Accommodation

Seriously: Religious Freedom and the 0 Centro Case, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 257,
271-72 (stating that Gonzales "indicates the justices' willingness to provide meaningful

content to Congress's accommodation inthe face of slippery-slope predictions").
253 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 435.
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government will have great difficulty making that demonstration here given
at issue and the minimal role of the prohibition in
both the limited exception
254
system.
tax
overall
the
Even assuming that preventing avoidance of this specific tax rule rises to the
level of a compelling interest, it is hard to argue that the prohibition is the least
restrictive means for furthering this interest. Outside of the purely speculative
danger of the creation of a "Church of Obama" or "Temple of Palin," both of
which would unlikely be viewed as politically wise or sincere religious
exercise by the IRS or the courts, general donations to a house of worship will
be used for a wide range of activities as opposed to simply funding the
occasional political message from the pulpit. 255 The formation of a house of
worship focusing on a single candidate or political party would also almost
certainly violate the private benefit prohibition, as a court found had occurred
when a number of Republicans formed an organization that, while undoubtedly
educational, primarily benefitted campaign workers who went on to help
Republican candidates. 256 In fact, for this reason any RFRA-based exception
should be limited to situations where the political campaign intervention
257
represents only an insubstantial amount of the house of worship's activity.
As for the possibility that donors might earmark their contributions specifically
for political activity in an attempt to avoid the general rule prohibiting
deductions of donations made for political expenditures, the Treasury
Department has already developed a less restrictive means to address this
lobbying efforts - simply
concern in the context of donations made to support258
earmarked.
so
is
donation
the
if
deduction
denying a
Finally, it could be argued that political campaign intervention unavoidably
serves the private interest of the candidates whom a house of worship chooses
to support, in contradiction to the general tax rule that charities must further
public and not private interests. 259 While it is certainly true that a house of
worship's support of a candidate furthers the candidate's private interest,
furthering of a private interest by a charity is permitted as long as the benefit to
See Paulsen, supra note 232, at 278-79 (making this point by examining how Lee
would fare under RFRA).
254

255See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (stating that an asserted

belief might be "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to
protection under the Free Exercise Clause").
256 Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1055-62, 1079 (1989).
257 While the term "insubstantial" is vague, it appears to be workable as houses of
worship, charities, the IRS, and courts have lived with such a limitation on lobbying activity
for over seventy years. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
258 Rev. Rul. 80-275, 1980-2 C.B. 69 ("No deduction is allowed under section 170 of the
Code for contributions to X earmarked for use in, or in connection with, attempting to
influence the legislation.").
259 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1990) (requiring organizations to serve "a
public rather than a private interest" in order to qualify for exemption under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3)).
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the private interest is both qualitatively and quantitatively incidental. 260 The
former requirement is met if it is unavoidable in order for the charity to further
its charitable (or in this context, religious) mission, such as when a charity pays
its staff (clearly benefitting their private interests) to accomplish its mission. 2 6 1
Here, that requirement could be easily met if the house of worship determines
that discussing the merits of the candidates or how to vote is an important part
of its religious mission, as the discussion above relating to substantial burden
demonstrates is not only plausible, but highly likely for many houses of
worship. 262 The latter requirement is met if the amount of private benefit is no
more than needed to accomplish the charitable goal. 263 That requirement is
also easily met, especially if the exception is limited to communications within
houses of worship where in many instances the marginal costs are minimal.
Moreover, if a house of worship engaging in political campaign intervention
through its sermons is not per se a prohibited private benefit, then the general
prohibition on inappropriate private benefits, which would still apply to houses
of worship, and not the political campaign intervention prohibition, is the least
264
restrictive means for enforcing that rule.
For all of these reasons, the government will have difficulty demonstrating
that applying the political campaign intervention prohibition to sermons is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. If the
interest at issue is the government's general interest in a sound tax system, the
threat to that system from a limited exception to the prohibition for sermons
during regular worship services is highly speculative. If the interest is instead
preventing avoidance of either the non-deductibility rule for political
expenditures or the private benefit rule for charities, it is relatively easy to
demonstrate that the blanket application of the prohibition to sermons is not the
least restrictive means of furthering either of those interests, even assuming
they are compelling. 265 It is therefore necessary to consider other possible
compelling governmental interests.
260 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec.

18, 1978) ("If [the private benefit] is

qualitatively and quantitatively incidental, then it is consistent with exemption."). See
generally John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REv. 1063 (2006)
(discussing possible rationales for and applications of the private benefit doctrine); Darryll
K. Jones, Private Benefit and the Unanswered Questionsfrom Redlands Surgical Services,
29 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 433 (2000) (addressing "the meaning and operation of the
private benefit doctrine").
26 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129 (holding that an organization formed to
preserve and improve a lake qualified for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) even though
there would be private benefit to lakefront property owners.).
262 See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
263 See Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210.
264 See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
265 Due to the difficulty of meeting the least restrictive means requirement, this Article
has intentionally avoided developing a specific definition of what constitutes a compelling
governmental interest (assuming such a definition is even possible). For a summary of
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Protectingthe Public, the Government, and the House of Worship

In addition to governmental interests relating to the tax system, other
commonly asserted interests relate to the potential harm that allowing even a
limited exception to the prohibition could cause to the public, the federal
government, and to the houses of worship themselves. The harm to the public
is the risk that permitting houses of worship to support or oppose candidates
creates a significant chance of corruption, or at least the appearance of
corruption, when candidates try to convince houses of worship to support
them. 266 Combating corruption and the appearance of corruption with respect
to current and prospective government officials is a compelling governmental
interest, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held in the context of election
law.267 What is not clear, however, is that prohibiting internal house of
worship communications regarding candidates furthers that interest or is the
least restrictive means for doing so. While there is some anecdotal evidence
that close (and often legal) relationships between nonprofits and politicians
may reflect or create the appearance of corruption, such evidence is spotty at
best.

26 8

Furthermore, federal election law currently permits corporations and unions
that are otherwise prohibited from making expenditures relating to the
endorsement of candidates to spend funds communicating such an
endorsement to their internal constituencies. 269 Congress therefore does not

various attempts to do so, see Berg, supra note 103, at 35-40. It is clear, however, that the
governmental interest must be particularly strong. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (characterizing the required level of
governmental interests as "'interests of the highest order' (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))).
266 See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 14, at 1329-30 ("As churches become more powerful and
integrated into political campaigns, churches also become more vulnerable, and the potential
for corruption increases .... [Tihe religion itself might be corrupted as politicians attempt
to control the church, or as the church is forced to sacrifice its views for the benefit of the
candidate that it supports.").
267 E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (finding "deterring actual
corruption and the avoiding any appearance thereof' to be an "important state interest"
behind the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976)
("[T]he [Federal Election Campaign] Act's primary purpose - to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions .. .[is] a
constitutionally sufficient justification.").
268 See, e.g., Jack Siegel, The Wild, the Innocent, and the K Street Shuffle: The Tax
System's Role in Policing InteractionsBetween Charitiesand Politicians,54 EXEMPT ORG.
TAX REV. 117, 117 (2006).
269 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A) (2006) (exempting from the spending prohibition
expenditures for "communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or
administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members and
their families on any subject"); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(j) (2008) (defining the "restricted
class" of certain membership organizations as their "members and executive or
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consider that such intra-organizational political support creates a significant
risk of corruption or appearance of corruption. Also, under federal election
law, both corporations and unions are able to engage in a broad range of
activities targeted at the public because the federal government can
constitutionally only bar them from paying for communications that constitute
express advocacy or are functionally equivalent to express advocacy. 270 As the
political campaign intervention prohibition covers a much broader range of
27
communications, it is not the least restrictive means to serve this interest. '
A related issue is that by permitting even this limited exception to the
prohibition, the government would be at least marginally increasing the funds
available for political campaign intervention through the charitable
contribution deduction.
However, since such subsidy is significantly
attenuated for the reasons already discussed, it is difficult to argue that this
concern rises to a level sufficient to increase the chance of corruption or the
appearance of corruption. 272 There also is little risk that the government could
be harmed by being perceived as supporting, through the exemption, a
particular set of candidates or a particular party since the exemption would not
be for any particular political view but instead for a type of otherwise
prohibited speech. 273 As the IRS has itself discovered, religiously motivated
political activity can be found across the political spectrum and is not, as might
be assumed, solely or primarily the province of either the religious right or the
religious left. 274 In regards to aiding one type of speech over all others, it is
hard to argue that the government has a compelling interest in preventing
speech about politics and candidates generally - if anything, the government's
interest should run in the opposite direction. Finally, regardless of whether the
charitable contribution deduction is viewed as a government subsidy, both the
intervening choice of donors regarding which organization to support and the
choice of houses of worship of whether to engage in political campaign
intervention eliminates any concern that the house of worship could be seen as
speaking on the government's behalf.
Another commonly cited protective interest is that greater political
involvement by houses of worship will undermine the distinctive role of such

administrative personnel, and their families"); id. § 114.3(a)(2) (extending the §
441b(b)(2)(A) exemption to certain membership organizations with respect to
communications with their restricted class).
270 See FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2007).
271 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
272 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
273 See Caron & Dessingue, supra note 14, at 187 (discussing the view that "the political
activity prohibition reflects a government interest in not subsidizing partisan political
activity" but concluding that there is no such interest, "much less one that is compelling").
274 See INSPECTOR, REVIEW, supra note 95, at 13-14 (concluding, based on a random
sampling of alleged political activity identified by the IRS, that tax-exempt organizations
"were supporting several political parties").
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entities as outside voices of dissent and challenge. 275 Indeed, some of the
strongest supporters for permitting houses of worship to be more involved
politically also recommend against houses of worship actually taking
advantage of such permission precisely because of this concern. 276 However,
if a house of worship is religiously motivated to become so involved, it is
difficult to argue that protecting it from itself is a compelling governmental
interest. 277 Moreover, the significant extent of the political involvement of
houses of worship historically - including highly publicized candidate
endorsements before the enactment of the prohibition - undermines the
assertion that the risk to houses of worship is so great that it justifies the
278
prohibition's application in this context.
To be fair to those that have raised these concerns about possible harm to
the public, to the government, and to the house of worship itself, they have
generally done so with respect to whether it would be wise for Congress to
permit an exception to the prohibition for houses of worship. Under RFRA,
these concerns either do not rise to the level of a compelling governmental
interest or, if they do, the prohibition as applied in this context is not the least
restrictive means for furthering that interest. These concerns therefore do not
provide the government with sufficient justification under RFRA to impose the
prohibition in this context.

275

See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 14, at 1322-26.

276 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN

41-58 (2000); Dessingue, supra

note 14, at 925-26.
277 See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An EconomicApproach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48 (1989) (characterizing such interests as
"[p]aternalism" and "the weakest government interest" that "should not be allowed to trump
a free exercise claim, except possibly in the most extreme circumstances"); see also
Buckles, supra note 14, at 1088-93 (arguing that on balance the prohibition is more harmful
to houses of worship than the likely effects of relaxing the prohibition with respect to such
institutions); Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First
Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 339-40 (2000) (addressing
concerns about "religious character" and "government control" with respect to the effect of
school-choice programs on religious schools); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of
Religious Exemptions, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 624-30 (1999) (discussing "paternalistic"
governmental interests and possible situations where they might be compelling).
278 See, e.g., Harry S. Stout, Rhetoric and Reality in the Early Republic: The Case of the
Federalist Clergy, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 62-74 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990)

(describing the involvement of Federalist clergy in politics during the first decades of the
United States, including election sermons that sought to influence how congregation
members voted); Mark S. Scarberry, John Leland and James Madison: Religious Influence
on the Ratification of the Constitution and on the Proposal of the Bill of Rights, 113 PENN
ST. L. REV. 733, 778-97 (2009) (describing the importance of pastoral support for James
Madison's election to the U.S. House of Representatives).
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Separationof Church and State

Finally, but not least importantly, there is the concern that permitting houses
of worship to be involved in supporting or opposing candidates for elected
public office threatens to undermine an important element of the separation of
church and state. This interest is not, however, well served by the
prohibition's application in this context or generally. First, the prohibition
only applies to houses of worship that claim the benefits of charitable status. A
house of worship that chose to forgo those benefits would only face the much
less comprehensive limitations imposed by election law. Second, the act of
having the IRS enforce the prohibition with respect to sermons itself threatens
to undermine the separation of church and state because it forces the IRS to
review church communications. Therefore, whether the prohibition, as applied
to such communications, enhances or undermines the separation of church and
state is debatable.
The correctness of this conclusion is demonstrated by considering why

RFRA and, more specifically, a RFRA-compelled exception to the prohibition
are not inconsistent with the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The
current prevailing standard for applying the Establishment Clause remains the
three-prong test stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,279 which requires that the law at
issue serve a "secular legislative purpose;" have a "principal or primary
effect... that neither advances nor inhibits religion[;]" and does not
impermissibly entangle church and state. 280 In its more recent Establishment
Clause cases, the Supreme Court has treated the non-entanglement requirement
28 1
as part of the effects inquiry.

279 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
280 Id., at 612-13.
The Lemon test does not apply if there is a facial denominational
preference, but that is not the case here. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982)
("[T]he Lemon v. Kurtzman 'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit
to all religions, and not to provisions . . . that discriminate among religions."). Some
Justices, and on occasion a majority of the Court, have also concluded that the Lemon test is
not applicable in certain contexts, such as challenges to religious monuments on state
grounds and school voucher programs. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681,
685-86 & n.4 (2005) (Rehnquist, J.) (listing recent Establishment Clause cases that have not
applied the Lemon test and concluding that the Lemon test is not useful in determining
"whether the Establishment Clause ... allows the display of a monument inscribed with the
Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds"); id. at 699-700 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (describing the Lemon test as a "useful guidepost[]" and concluding that no
single test can resolve all Establishment Clause cases). But see id. at 703-04 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (relying to a limited extent on the Lemon test in determining that the Ten
Commandments display is constitutional).
281 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) ("[lIt is simplest to recognize
why entanglement is significant and treat it ... as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's
effect."); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(Thomas, J.) (affirming Agostini).
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Courts have had little difficulty concluding that RFRA does not violate the
Establishment Clause under the Lemon test. 28 2 With respect to the first prong,
the Supreme Court has stated that "it is a permissible legislative purpose to
alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. '28 3 Easing
governmental interference in religious activities is clearly the purpose behind
RFRA. 284 With respect to the second prong, the Supreme Court has stated that
in order for this element not to be satisfied, "it must be fair to say that the
government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and
influence. '285 RFRA, at most, frees religious individuals and institutions to
advance religion through their activities and influence, not the federal
government's. In regards to the third prong, by exempting the religiously
motivated conduct of such individuals and organizations from valid, neutral,
and otherwise generally applicable laws, the federal government will usually
be less, not more, involved in their religious activities.
The fact that RFRA does not generally violate the Establishment Clause
does not, however, necessarily mean that the clause is irrelevant with respect to
Courts will need to consider the
this specific application of RFRA.
Establishment Clause issue, assuming the government raises it, because of the
general doctrine that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, in a manner that
renders them constitutional. 286 There are two possible Establishment Clause
objections to a RFRA-required exception in this context. First, by allowing at
least some amount of government "subsidy" to support candidate-related
communications by houses of worship, while denying such a subsidy to secular
charities, the exception requires government to support religious organizations
over secular organizations. Second, by requiring the government to determine
which institutions are legitimate houses of worship and what candidate-related
communications are sufficiently religiously motivated to meet the substantial

282 E.g., In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 862-63 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing how RFRA
passes each prong of the Lemon test); Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1530 (9th
Cir. 1997); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated on other
grounds, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386, 399-401 (D. Idaho 1998).
283 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
284 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)-(b) (2006) (congressional findings and declaration of
purposes).
285 Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original).
286 E.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) ("[A]n Act of
Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available."); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50
(1961) ("Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality.").
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burden requirement, the exception excessively entangles the government with
houses of worship. Neither objection, however, is ultimately convincing.
With respect to the subsidy argument, the subsidy here is both indirect and
attenuated and thus does not rise to a level that offends the Establishment
Clause. It is indirect in that individual donors receive the immediate tax
benefit, and they, not the government, choose whether to give to politically
active houses of worship. The subsidy is therefore similar to more direct forms
of support provided by the government, such as school vouchers, that have
survived Establishment Clause scrutiny because of the existence of an
intervening, private decision maker.2 87 The subsidy here is also attenuated in
that only a portion of the costs of the political activity, and likely a relatively
small portion, will actually be subsidized both because of the limited number
of donors who are able to deduct their contributions and the limited benefit
those donors receive by doing so. 2 88 While the degree of attenuation could
change in the future, its current level is another argument against this subsidy
concern.
The Supreme Court's holding in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock that a state
sales tax exemption for religious periodicals violates the Establishment Clause
does not alter this conclusion, even if the Establishment Clause reasoning of
the two opinions that make up the majority is accepted. 289 In Bullock, Justice
Brennan's three-Justice lead opinion states that assuming that a tax exemption
limited to religious activities or organizations is not mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause, it will only survive Establishment Clause scrutiny if it does
not "burden nonbeneficiaries markedly" and is seen as "removing a significant
state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion." 290 Justice Brennan
states that the tax exemption at issue fails this standard, in part because it
"burdens nonbeneficiaries by increasing their tax bills."' 291 Justice Blackmun's
concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, takes a different approach. 292 Justice
Blackmun differentiates between a statutory preference for the dissemination
287 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (finding that a school voucher

program did not violate the Establishment Clause because the aid only reached religious
schools indirectly and as the result of parents' choices).
288 See supra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing how any threat posed by taxdeductable donations to the soundness of the tax system is significantly attenuated because
most donors probably will not deduct their contributions).
289 See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) (holding that "when confined exclusively to publications advancing the tenets of a
religious faith, the exemption runs afoul of the Establishment Clause"); id. at 28 (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (concluding that "a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature by

religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause." (emphasis in original)).
290 Id. at 15 (Brennan, J.).
291 Id. at 19 n.8.
292 Id. at 28-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The sixth vote for the Court's judgment was
that of Justice White, who based his concurrence on the Press Clause of the First
Amendment. Id. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring).
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of religious ideas, which in his opinion, offends the Establishment Clause; and
accommodating religion, for example, by barring the state from denying
unemployment compensation to employees who refuse to work on their
293
Sabbath.
Neither Justice Brennan's reasoning, nor Justice Blackmun's is applicable to
a RFRA-based exception for religiously motivated political sermons. Implicit
in Justice Brennan's burden analysis is the assumption that the religious
publications at issue will continue to be sold in significant amounts even
without the exemption; and so a significant burden on the public fisc, and
therefore on other taxpayers, is relieved by eliminating the exemption. 294 In
the sermon context, it is much more plausible to assume that even among the
houses of worship that may feel compelled to deliver political sermons, the
vast majority will refrain from doing so if the cost is the loss of the ability to
receive tax-deductible contributions for all of their activities. This fact will
therefore leave the amount of tax revenues collected before and after the
creation of exemption essentially unchanged. Under Justice Blackmun's
preference versus accommodation distinction, a RFRA-based exception for
religiously motivated political sermons is more akin to an accommodation
because, like the religiously observant unemployment compensation recipient,
the houses of worship at issue would qualify for a government benefit for a
religiously motivated activity that is not an affront to the primary requirements
for receiving the benefit. 295 The federal government could, of course, choose
not to offer the benefit, but once it does and a religious individual or institution
qualifies, the federal government is not violating the Establishment Clause by
creating an exception to a condition on the benefit that bars religiously
motivated or compelled conduct.
As for the entanglement concern, it is offset by the entanglement concern
raised by not creating an exception. Without an exception, the government in the form of the IRS - is required to review sermons and evaluate them for
their likely electoral impact. Such involvement in internal house of worship
affairs is hardly less entangling than the inquiries that an exception would
require. Furthermore, the government already has to determine what entities
are legitimate houses of worship for numerous purposes, not the least of which
293 Id. at 28-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
294 See Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why
They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 441 (1999) (concluding that the lead opinion in
Texas Monthly "focused on the fact that the particular legislative exemption for religion
would have imposed significant costs on others - costs out of proportion to the burdens the
exemption would remove from religious practice").
295 See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006) (listing the requirements for an organization to
receive tax deductible contributions); KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 173 (2006) ("The conditions for
[unemployment compensation] benefits remain roughly the same for those who do not
object to Saturday work, whether or not the law creates a limited exception [for
Sabbatarians].").
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is eligibility for numerous federal tax benefits that are available to such
entities, but not other, secular organizations. 296 As for inquiring into religious
motivations for particular conduct, such an inquiry is a necessary and
unavoidable part of applying both RFRA generally and, in many even postSmith instances, the Free Exercise Clause. Thus neither one of these roles for
the government represents excessive entanglement.
If anything, there is a strong argument that permitting an exception to the
prohibition for sermons and possibly other internal house of worship
communications avoids more entanglement concerns than it creates. Even
though the internet and the widespread recording of sermons and worship
services may permit the IRS to monitor internal house of worship
communications without having to physically darken a house of worship's
door, it does raise entanglement concerns if government employees are
required to evaluate numerous religious messages in light of the prohibition.
The exception relieves the IRS of this burden, at least in part, by reducing the
need for this scrutiny. It also relieves the IRS of the difficult task of deciding
how to enforce the prohibition with respect to these communications, including
determining the appropriate sanctions to impose if it finds an apparent
violation. The Establishment Clause therefore does not bar RFRA from
requiring an exception to the prohibition for some or all internal house of
worship communications. Thus, the separation of church and state is not a
compelling government interest that is furthered by the application of the
prohibition to such communications.
Ultimately, if a house of worship is able to demonstrate that the prohibition
as applied to its sermons or other internal communications places a substantial
burden on its exercise of religion, the government will have a difficult time
demonstrating that the burden is justified under RFRA. A house of worship
that can demonstrate that both its candidate-related message and the inclusion
of that message in a sermon are religiously motivated, and so constitute the
exercise of religion within the meaning and protection of RFRA, should be
able to make this demonstration, as the current IRS interpretation of the
prohibition indicates that engaging in such conduct results in the loss of the
ability to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions for any activity.
While the government will be able to cite to a plethora of possible compelling
interests, the prohibition as applied to internal house of worship
communications either does not significantly further those interests or is not
the least restrictive means for furthering them. What the above discussion fails
296 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-30-028 (Apr. 28, 2008) (denying an organization

that "conducts some 'street ministry' activities" classification as a church and tax-exempt
status under I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3) and 509(a)(1)). See generally Charles M. Whelan,
"Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FoRDHAM L. REv.
885 (1977) (discussing how "church distinctions" in the Internal Revenue Code cause
"considerable concem and confusion among church leaders, members of the bar, and the
officials of the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service who are responsible
for their interpretation and enforcement").
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to address completely, however, is the fact that a political sermon is not only
the activity of a religious individual, but also of a religious institution. As this
Part suggests, the law of religious liberty also has a, perhaps underappreciated, institutional dimension, to which this Article now turns.
IV.

INSTITUTIONAL FREE EXERCISE

What arguably is most jarring about the application of the political
campaign intervention prohibition to sermons is that it involves government
regulation of not only the religiously motivated conduct of individuals, but also
of communications between the leadership of a religious institution and its
members. Even if the RFRA-based argument above is accepted, it only
extends to the unique context of sermons, leaving many houses of worship for
which a sermon or homily is not a religiously significant form of
communication, unprotected. Given RFRA's lack of complete protection, the
government, through application of the prohibition, is still able to interfere not
only with the ability of an individual to follow his or her religious convictions
- the situation the case law described above is designed to address - but also
with the internal functioning of an institution that seeks to communicate and
develop those convictions. The courts have previously recognized that in
certain contexts this institutional aspect should be acknowledged and should
influence the scope of the First Amendment's protection for the conduct at
issue. What they have not conclusively addressed, however, is how broad that
influence should be, including whether it would address the application of the
prohibition to political campaign intervention by houses of worship.
This Part addresses that open question. The first Section examines the
current state of the church autonomy doctrine and its potential ramifications for
political sermons. This Section concludes both that the doctrine survived the
Smith decision and that the logical extension of the doctrine, which this Article
re-characterizes as "institutional free exercise," requires a conclusion that
application of the prohibition to sermons and other internal house of worship
religious communications is unconstitutional. The second Section revisits the
previous RFRA analysis and considers whether this institutional free exercise
approach is available under RFRA and, if so, how it would affect that analysis.
The second Section concludes that this approach is available, but only with
respect to the substantial burden requirement of RFRA. Applying the
institutional free exercise approach to the substantial burden requirement of
RFRA, this Article concludes that the statute ultimately strengthens the
grounds for determining that the prohibition, as applied to internal religious
communications, places a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by
houses of worship and supports a broader exception to the prohibition than
RFRA would otherwise require.
A.

The FirstAmendment

Pre-Smith, the federal courts recognized that the First Amendment's free
exercise of religion clause protected religious institutions - as opposed to
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individuals - from even valid, neutral, and generally applicable laws in two
contexts. 297 The first is when civil courts are asked to resolve intra-church (or
intra-denominational) disputes that involve significant ecclesiastical matters. 298
The second context is when such courts are asked to resolve employment
disputes involving ministers and other employees who perform religious
functions. In this context, most of the federal circuits have found that such

decisions, often involving religiously motivated actions, cannot be subject to

government regulation under the First Amendment, 299 although the Supreme
Court has not directly ruled in this area. 300 The open questions are whether the
church autonomy doctrine survived the Smith decision and, if it did, whether it

applies in the context of the political campaign intervention prohibition's
application to sermons and internal house of worship communications.
1.

The Church Autonomy Doctrine Post-Smith
With respect to the survival of the church autonomy doctrine, the Court in
Smith briefly acknowledged the unique nature of intra-church dispute cases
297 See generally Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The
Surprising Lesson of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633 (surveying Supreme Court cases that
support "a broad right of 'church autonomy' that prohibits government interference with
internal church affairs regardless of whether the activities affected are religious in nature or
more mundane administrative matters"); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in
the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409 (1986) (discussing the contexts in which the right of
church autonomy is well established).
298 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 447 (1969); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 190-91 (1960); Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952); Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699,
714 (4th Cir. 2002). See generally Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial
Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378 (1981) (discussing the
rationale behind judicial reluctance to resolve internal church disputes).
299 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Every one of our
sister circuits to consider the issue has concluded that application of Title VII [of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964] to a minister-church relationship would violate - or would risk violating
- the First Amendment and, accordingly, has recognized some version of the ministerial
exception.").
" See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628-29
(1986) (ordering the dismissal of a religious school's challenge to a state investigation into
alleged sex discrimination when the school would have the opportunity to raise its
constitutional claims in the state administrative proceedings or the state court review of
those proceedings, without commenting on the merit of those claims); NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (construing the statutory grant of jurisdiction to
the NLRB so as to avoid the "significant risk" that the NLRB's jurisdiction would infringe
on free exercise of religion if extended to teachers at church-operated schools); Gerard V.
Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1066-68
(1989) (discussing the Court's avoidance of the issue in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)).
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and suggested, at least implicitly, their continued viability post-Smith.301 As
for the application of the doctrine in the employment context, federal courts
that have addressed the issue have consistently concluded that it is still
viable. 30 2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
provided the most fulsome explanation for this conclusion:
It does not follow, however, that Smith stands for the proposition that a
church may never be relieved from [an obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability]. We say this for two reasons.
First, the burden on free exercise that is addressed by the ministerial
exception [to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] is of a
fundamentally different character from that at issue in Smith and in the
cases cited by the Court in support of its holding. The ministerial
exception is not invoked to protect the freedom of an individual to
observe a particular command or practice of his church. Rather, it is
designed to protect the freedom of the church to select those who will
carry out its religious mission. Moreover, the ministerial exception does
not present the dangers warned of in Smith. Protecting the authority of a
church to select its own ministers free of government interference does
not empower a member of that church, by virtue of his beliefs, to become
a law unto himself. Nor does the exception require judges to determine
the centrality of religious beliefs before applying a compelling interest
test in the free exercise field.
Second, while it is true that some of the cases that have invoked the
ministerial exception have cited the compelling interest test, all of them
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The government may not...
lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.").
No federal court appears to have had to address explicitly whether the doctrine survives in
the intra-church dispute context post-Smith, although at least one federal appellate court
apparently assumes that it does. Dixon, 290 F.3d at 714-15 ("The Court has consistently
recognized that First Amendment values are jeopardized when church litigation turns on the
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.").
31

" E.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656 (10th Cir.
2002); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.* (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington
v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1302-04 (11 th Cir. 2000); Combs
v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349-50
(5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But
see Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that proceeding
on claims "based on statues that are otherwise valid, generally applicable, and facially
neutral . . . does not violate the church's free exercise rights" and is "[c]onsitent with
Smith"). Given the enactment of RFRA, it is possible that courts may, in the future, base the
ministerial exception on RFRA instead of on the First Amendment. See Hankins v. Lyght,
441 F.3d 96, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2006) (asserting that RFRA displaces the "judge-made"
ministerial exception). But see Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204 (2d Cir. 2008)
(distinguishing Hankins and concluding that the constitutionally based ministerial exception
is still available when parties explicitly waive their rights under RFRA).
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rely on a long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental
right of churches to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
30 3
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.
The brief mention of the intra-church dispute cases in Smith, the absence of
any indication that Smith overruled those cases in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, and the care the Court took in Smith to distinguish its earlier free
exercise decisions, indicate that Smith does not overturn the long line of
Supreme Court church autonomy cases or take a position on the employmentrelated application of the church autonomy doctrine by the lower courts. As
articulated by the D.C. Circuit, those cases address an institutional application
of the Free Exercise Clause that is distinct from the individual assertion of
religious freedom addressed in Smith.3°4 Granting exemptions from valid,
neutral, and generally applicable laws in the limited contexts where the
autonomy of religious institutions is clearly at risk does not create the same
threat to such laws as granting exemptions based on what may be a single
individual's assertion of religious belief.
That said, the question still exists whether the church autonomy doctrine
extends to some or all internal house of worship communications, such as
sermons. There is only limited case law on this point, almost certainly because
governments generally do not seek to regulate internal house of worship
communications, presumably because of the significant constitutional issues
raised by doing so. 30 5 In fact, the Internal Revenue Code may be unique in
even conditioning receipt by houses of worship of a preferential status - the
ability to receive tax-deductible contributions - upon their refraining from
including certain content in communications. This is especially noteworthy
because the Establishment Clause would, at least, normally preclude direct
government funding of house of worship activities. In Bryce v. Episcopal
Church in the Diocese of Colorado, however, the court applied the church

autonomy doctrine to bar claims of sexual harassment made by a youth
minister and her partner when it found that the statements at issue "clearly
addressed religious topics," and were made "in the context of an internal
church dialogue." 30 6 Bryce suggests that the church autonomy doctrine should
303 Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 462 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).
304 Id.
301 The fact that development of this doctrine by the courts has been sporadic and

incomplete also limits the case law. See Bradley, supra note 300, at 1061 (observing that
the church autonomy doctrine "is the least developed, most confused of our church-state
analyses"); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the
Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 526 (2007) ("[T]he 'church autonomy'

doctrine is more of a grab-bag of precedents than a clear rule or prohibition.").
30 Bryce, 289 F.3d at 659; see also Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Rigbt [sic] to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1403 (1981) [hereinafter Laycock, General Theory]

2009]

POLITICS AT THE PULPIT

protect sermons and other internal communications of a house of worship, at
least those with religious content, but further inquiry must be made into the
reasons behind the church autonomy doctrine to determine whether this
suggestion is correct and applicable to political sermons.
The consistent underlying basis cited for the church autonomy doctrine as
applied in the intra-church dispute context may be summarized as follows: to
involve the government in resolving ecclesiastical disputes would be improper
because it would require civil courts to engage questions that they have no
authority to resolve, while at the same time displacing the religious bodies with
just such authority. 30 7 The Supreme Court has, however, been vague regarding
whether the constitutional basis for this position derives from the Free Exercise
Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, although its
statements indicate that it relies on both clauses. 30 8 Regardless of the exact
basis for this position, this reasoning has led the Supreme Court to limit the
reach of the church autonomy doctrine to situations where the courts would
have to answer ecclesiastical questions to resolve the dispute, while permitting
civil courts to resolve disputes when doing so does not require answering such
questions. 30 9 This approach therefore only requires the government to avoid
3 10
second-guessing purely ecclesiastical decisions.
In the employment context, however, the federal appellate courts have gone
further based on both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses,
although they have split on the exact extent to which the church autonomy

("An organization's claim to autonomy is strongest with respect to internal affairs, including
relationships between the organization and all persons who have voluntarily joined it."
(footnote omitted)).
307 See Serbian E. Orthodox Dioceses v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1976).
308 See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969) (recognizing as support both "the full and free right to entertain
any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine
which does not violate the laws of morality and property" and that "[t]he law knows ... the
establishment of no sect" (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29
(1871))); see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (approving one approach to such
disputes because it promises both "nonentanglement and neutrality"); Thomas C. Berg,
Religious OrganizationalFreedom and Conditions on Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 165, 168-79 (2009) (arguing that religious organization autonomy rests both on
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause principles, as well as on more general
equality concerns).
309 See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 (concluding that "a State may adopt any one of various
approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of
doctrinal matters" (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God,
Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970))). But see id. at 616-18 (Powell, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
majority's approach and arguing that civil courts should limit their role to determining and
then following the intra-church resolution of the dispute).
310 There are hints, however, of support for a broader concept of church autonomy in at
least some of the Supreme Court's decisions. See Brady, supra note 297, at 1638-49.
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doctrine protects such decisions. 311 Several courts have held that the church
autonomy doctrine protection does not extend to situations where the basis for
the decision at issue was both prohibited and secular. 3 12 While not stated in
these cases, presumably the reasoning for this position is similar to the
Supreme Court's reasoning in the intra-church dispute context: civil courts
should only abstain from resolving disputes that turn on resolution of
ecclesiastical questions that are not within the authority of such courts to
resolve. This interpretation could be labeled a "weak" approach to the
ministerial exception. 31 3 This interpretation of the church autonomy doctrine
is, however, somewhat stronger than that taken in the intra-church dispute
context, since the courts will abstain from second-guessing such religiously
motivated decisions even if they violate secular law.
Other courts have concluded that the civil courts must abstain from any
involvement with house of worship employment decisions, even if the basis for

311 See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205-10 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding a "well

entrenched" ministerial exception to bar a priest's race discrimination claim); Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-06 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding a "ministerial exception,"
arising under the Free Exercise Clause, which bars any claim whose resolution would
infringe upon a religious institution's right to determine the individual responsible for
performing spiritual functions); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289
F.3d 648, 655-59 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying the church autonomy doctrine to bar plaintiffs'
sexual harassment claims); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164, 1169-72 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that "the Constitution requires that civil
authorities decline to review either the procedures for selection or the qualifications of those
chosen or rejected," when the plaintiff brought an action charging church with sexual and
racial discrimination after he was denied a pastoral position). But see, e.g., DeMarco v,
Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing only the Establishment
Clause in a case upholding a lay teacher's age discrimination claim against a parochial
school).
312 See, e.g., Bryce, 289 F.3d at 657 ("The church autonomy doctrine is not without
limits, however, and does not apply to purely secular decisions, even when made by
churches."); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 328-32
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding that application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to a
religious schools' lay faculty did not violate First Amendment); DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 171-72
(holding that the Establishment clause is not violated in an age discrimination inquiry where
religious issues are isolable); Minker v. Bait. Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff should be
allowed to attempt to prove his case so long as pursuing the matter further would not "create
an excessive entanglement with religion"). But see Bryce, 289 F.3d at 658 n.2 (suggesting
the court was not relying on the ministerial exception, but only on the broader church
autonomy doctrine); DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 172 (acknowledging that a different rule might
apply if the relationship between employee and employer was pervasively religious).
311 See Paul Horwitz, Universities as FirstAmendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers
and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1497, 1521 (2007) (discussing weak and strong
approaches for treating universities as First Amendment institutions, analogizing the strong
approach in that context to this position in the religious institutions context).
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those decisions is purely secular, because otherwise "secular authorities would
necessarily intrude into church governance in a manner that would be
inherently coercive" and thus unconstitutional. 314 The reasoning of these
courts is that under the First Amendment, certain internal activities of religious
institutions that are vitally important for establishing and communicating the
religious identity of the institution must be off limits to government rules that
315
normally would limit the permissible grounds for employment decisions.
This interpretation could be labeled a "strong approach" to the ministerial
exception.
The breadth of the church autonomy doctrine has important ramifications
for determining its application in the context of the political campaign
intervention prohibition's application to sermons and other internal house of
worship communications. If one accepts the intra-church dispute approach
used by the Supreme Court, but not the ministerial exception created by the
appellate courts, the doctrine would only be relevant if application of the
prohibition required the IRS or the courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.
Determining whether communications have the effect of supporting or
opposing a candidate for elected public office is, however, a purely secular
issue. 316 Applying the prohibition does not, therefore, require either the IRS or
the courts to resolve any ecclesiastical questions and so the doctrine provides
no protection.
If one instead accepts the weaker version of the ministerial exception
approach, the doctrine will only apply if a house of worship can demonstrate
that the candidate-related content of its sermon is based on religious
motivations, in the same way that courts accepting this approach only use the
doctrine to shield employment decisions that a religious institution proves are
religiously motivated. Such a burden of proof could easily lead to the IRS and
houses of worship engaging in lengthy evidentiary disputes relating to the
motivations of the houses of worship and their leadership. Moreover, the
prohibition only applies if a house of worship accepts the tax benefit of
Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Petruska,462 F.3d at 304 n.7, 307 (citing cases taking the
view that civil courts must abstain from involvement with employment decisions); EEOC v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000) ("The [ministerial] exception
314

precludes any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons behind a church's ministerial
employment decision."); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious
Entities in Our Constitutional Order,47 VILL. L. REv. 37, 91-92 (2002) (arguing that courts
should avoid addressing religious employment disputes because "[t]hose who act as clergy,

or who teach others to act as clergy," are "the lifeblood of the institution's expression messenger and message are inseparable").
35 See, e.g., Combs, 173 F.3d at 350 ("The second quite independent concern is that in
investigating employment discrimination claims by ministers against their church, secular
authorities would necessarily intrude into church governance in a manner that would be
inherently coercive, even if the alleged discrimination were purely nondoctrinal.").
316 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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deductible contributions. A house of worship that either surrendered that
benefit or created an affiliate that did not enjoy that benefit could, at least
indirectly, support or oppose candidates. As a result, the prohibition's level of
interference with church autonomy is arguably much less than the interference
involved in either resolving intra-church disputes based on theological
questions, or overriding a house of worship's religiously motivated decisions
regarding ministerial employees.
If one accepts the stronger version of the ministerial exception approach,
however, then there should be certain spheres of activity that should be
considered protected almost entirely from government regulation. 3 17 By
interpreting the church autonomy doctrine in this fashion, houses of worship
would be protected from government regulation with respect to the activities
important to fulfilling their religious mission, subject to a few general
limitations, such as whether the activity is primarily an internal or an external
one, and a few specific limitations, for instance in areas of particular
318
government concern, such as prisons, and, perhaps, criminalized behavior.
One such sphere of activity would naturally be internal house of worship
religious communications, including sermons.
Determining whether one of the existing approaches the correct, or whether
some in-between approach is a better application of the First Amendment,
requires consideration of the underlying constitutional reasons for having a
church autonomy doctrine in the first place.
2. Constitutional Grounds for an Institutional Approach
Various scholars have attempted to fill in the theoretical gap left by the
courts applying the church autonomy doctrine. For example, Professor Carl
Esbeck has developed a comprehensive Establishment Clause justification for
the strongest approach. 319 In his view, the Establishment Clause "functions as
317 Courts have also applied the doctrine to religious institutions other than houses of
worship with respect to employment decisions, but that aspect of the doctrine's breadth is
beyond the scope of this article. See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc.,
363 F.3d 299, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2004) (listing ministerial exception cases involving
religiously affiliated schools, hospitals, and other entities); see also NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979) (concluding that application of the National
Labor Relations Act to church-operated schools would raise serious First Amendment
questions); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63-67 (1983) (discussing and contrasting the Supreme
Court's treatment of religious schools faced with government regulation in NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983)).
3I See Laycock, General Theory, supra note 306, at 1403-09 (discussing the distinction
between internal and external affairs).
319 Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with
Religious Organizations,41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 347-52, 379-420 (1984) [hereinafter
Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits]; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Toward a General Theory
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a structural provision regimenting the nature and degree of involvement
between government and religious associations." 320 The need for civil courts
to avoid resolving intra-church disputes, for government not to regulate
employment decisions involving ministerial employees or religiously based
social welfare program decisions, and for government generally to avoid
excessive entanglement with religious matters, therefore flows from a proper
interpretation of this regimentation function. Professor Esbeck views the
function as stipulating that "government must avoid any involvement with
religious societies that may touch upon the matters central to their religious
identity and mission."'321 His reliance on the Establishment Clause, as opposed
to the Free Exercise Clause, stems from his conclusion that the Free Exercise
Clause is primarily about individuals, while the Establishment Clause is about
institutions, specifically the relationship between governmental and religious
institutions. 32 2 Given his interpretation of the Establishment Clause, he
naturally supports the strongest approach to the church autonomy doctrine,
although others applying a similar Establishment Clause based approach have
323
advocated a more moderate level of protection.
Professor Douglas Laycock, in contrast, has developed a theoretical basis
that relies primarily on the Free Exercise Clause. 324 The foundation for his
choice is the view that the Establishment Clause primarily relates to
government support for religion, while the Free Exercise Clause primarily
relates to government burdens or restrictions on religion. 325 Since the church
autonomy doctrine, whatever its exact form, is about preventing government
from restricting choices by religious institutions, it must therefore flow from

of Church-State Relations and the First Amendment, 4 PUB. L. F. 325, 330-31 (1985)
[hereinafter Esbeck, Toward a General Theory].
320 Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 319, at 348.
321 Id. at 381.
322 Esbeck, Toward a General Theory, supra note 319, at 330-31; see also Berg, supra
note 308, at 172-77 (building on Esbeck's approach to argue for an Establishment Clausebased, dual jurisdictions view of religious organization autonomy); Ira C. Lupu, Free
Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination,67
B.U. L. REv. 391, 416-31 (1987) [hereinafter, Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption] (arguing that

the Free Exercise Clause's protection is limited to individuals, and so does not support the
institutional-focused church autonomy doctrine).
323 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 314, at 92 (concluding, with caveats, that religious
entities occupy a "distinctive place" in our "constitutional order," such that when they act in
"uniquely religious ways," as opposed to in ways indistinguishable from other nonprofits,
the government must avoid interfering with their internal life and self-governance).
324 Laycock, General Theory, supra note 306; see also Brady, supra note 297, at 1672-79
(drawing support from the Smith decision and, through that decision, the Free Exercise

Clause, for a broad right of church autonomy).
325 Laycock, General Theory, supra note 306, at 1384.
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the Free Exercise Clause. 326 Working from this basis, he generally concludes
that what this Article has identified as the strongest approach is the correct one,
327
although he recognizes that some limits are required.
This Article agrees that a basis for the church autonomy doctrine can be
found in the Establishment Clause, particularly when there is a risk that
government interference with a particular activity could create significant
entanglement concerns. There are, however, several reasons why the church
autonomy doctrine should not be based primarily or exclusively on the
Establishment Clause, at least in the context of the political campaign
intervention prohibition. First, if the main establishment concern is one of
entanglement, as the courts that have discussed this concern to any extent have
generally indicated, it is unclear whether and how the doctrine should apply
when there are entanglement issues raised both when applying the government
regulation at issue, and when determining the scope of the doctrine's
protection. 328 As previously discussed, the application of the political
campaign intervention prohibition to sermons and other internal house of
worship communications presents exactly this type of situation. 329
Second, reliance primarily on the Establishment Clause in the absence of
clear entanglement concerns fails to provide guidance regarding how strong
the church autonomy doctrine should be. As Professors Ira Lupu and Robert
Tuttle have explained, one's view of what regimentation is created by the
Establishment Clause ultimately turns on one's view of whether that clause
recognizes religious institutions as having a distinctive role in society. 330
Accepting that religious institutions have a distinctive role can lead to
significantly different views regarding the extent to which that role is protected
from government interference by the Establishment Clause.33' The Free
326 In contrast to Professor Esbeck, Professor Laycock views the entanglement aspect of

Establishment Clause doctrine to be incoherent and therefore unhelpful. Compare id. at
1392 (deeming entanglement "useless as an analytic tool"), with Esbeck, Establishment
Clause Limits, supra note 319, at 381 (explaining entanglement in terms of the doctrine of
judicial avoidance of intrafaith disputes).
327 Laycock, General Theory, supra note 306, at 1402.
But see Lupu, Free Exercise
Exemption, supra note 322, at 431 (rejecting an institutional view of the Free Exercise
Clause and instead basing a limited church autonomy doctrine on freedom of association).
328 See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 311 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
550 U.S. 903 (2007); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1169-70 (4th Cir. 1985).
329 See supra notes 286-296 and accompanying text.
330 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 314, at 37-92.
331 Compare Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 319, at 381
("[Glovemment must avoid any involvement with religious societies that may touch upon
the matters central to their religious identity and mission."), with Lupu & Tuttle, supra note
314, at 92 ("When [religious] institutions perform functions indistinguishable from other
segments of the nonprofit world, the law should treat them as their secular counterparts are
treated.").
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Exercise Clause, in contrast, clearly views the exercise of religion as a liberty
requiring strong, albeit limited, protection from government interference. The
key questions under the latter clause is whether that protection extends to
religious institutions as well as individuals and, if it does, whether such
protection takes a different, stronger form than the protection provided for
individuals.
Third and finally, even if one accepts the view that the Free Exercise Clause
primarily protects individuals, there is a strong argument that it also protects
religious institutions under what Professor Lupu has characterized as a theory
of derivative rights: while it is individuals who hold religious beliefs that they
then exercise, the role of religious institutions in that exercise justifies
protecting those institutions as well. 332 Professor Lupu ultimately concludes
that this argument is unpersuasive, because an institution cannot itself have
conscience or heartfelt concerns - that is, religious institutions do not have
religious beliefs on which they act, only individuals do - and granting them
protection "might permit the successful assertion of bad faith exemption
claims. '333 This conclusion is too cramped a view of the role of religious
institutions. Such institutions are not only vehicles for the implementation of
individual religious beliefs, although this is one of their important functions;
they are also vehicles for the development, refinement, and communication of
such beliefs, and the ramifications of those beliefs for conduct, to both current
adherents and possible converts. 334 In the same way that "[t]he right to choose

ministers without government restriction underlies the well-being of religious
community, for perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those
whom it selects to preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its
doctrines," 335 the very survival of any particular set of religious beliefs and
practices depends in large part on the ability of such institutions to
communicate internally without government restriction. The very individual
right that the Free Exercise Clause clearly protects is therefore dependent on
the ability of such institutions to function free from government regulation, at
least with respect to those activities that are most important to perpetuating
their faith. The unquestioned protection that the Free Exercise Clause provides
for an individual's internal beliefs (as opposed to conduct) are parallel to the
protection this Article argues should come from the church autonomy doctrine
for an institution's communication of its beliefs to its members. For this
reason, a better name for this approach in the free exercise context is
"institutional free exercise," as opposed to the "church autonomy doctrine."
This institutional free exercise reasoning is also consistent with the recent
recognition that certain constitutional rights may not be fully protected unless
332 Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption, supra note 322, at 426.
333 Id. at

427.
314 For a more in-depth development of this view, see Brady, supra note 297, at 1675-77.
335 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (4th
Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
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the special role that certain distinct types of institutions play with respect to
those rights is recognized and protected. This movement began about ten years
ago, when Professor Frederick Schauer raised the issue of whether, particularly
in the context of government land, government funds, and government
employees, some types of institutions should enjoy a certain level of autonomy
with respect to their speech, even if that speech is government-funded. 336 A
number of other scholars have examined the role of such institutions and the
protections that they should enjoy as institutions under both the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses. 337 In each of these contexts, scholars have
concluded that a sensitivity to the role of particular institutions in realizing the
constitutionally protected liberties at issue is needed to fully protect those
liberties. 338 While the exact ramifications of this sensitivity are open to debate,
it necessarily leads to broader protection for those institutions from
government regulation than the courts currently provide. Moreover, whatever
the strength of this approach under other provisions of the First Amendment,
the unique role of religious institutions may require a greater level of
institutional protection than justified in other contexts as already acknowledged
339
by the courts.
Finally, this approach would also represent an acknowledgement that just as
government has, as Professor Lupu calls them, certain "enclaves," such as
prisons and the military, where its control should be given great deference even
in the face of free exercise claims, 340 houses of worship have similar
institutional spheres of authority. In these limited contexts the authority of the
religious institution should generally trump, in the same way that in the
government enclaves the authority of the government generally trumped even
pre-Smith.

3. Applying Institutional Free Exercise
Returning to the prohibition and political sermons, under this institutional
free exercise approach at least some internal house of worship communications
336 Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L.

REV. 84, 86-87 (1998) (discussing the possible "autonomy" of journalistic and art
organizations).
117 E.g., Richard W. Garnett,

Do Churches Matter?

Towards an Institutional

Understandingof the Religion Clauses, 53 VLL. L. REV. 273, 273-95 (2008) (discussing an
institutional approach. to the Religion Clauses, and the role of churches generally); Horwitz,
supra note 313, at 1497-1558 (discussing universities as "First Amendment institutions");
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 314, at 37-92 (addressing the broader question of whether
religious institutions occupy a "distinctive place" in our "constitutional order"); see also
Horwitz, supra note 313, at 1503 n.26 (citing other articles addressing the issue of
institutions and First Amendment rights).
338 E.g., Horwitz, supra note 313, at 1512; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 314, at 40.
339 See Horwitz, supra note 313, at 1522.
340 Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA, supra note 103, at 175, 180-81 (identifying certain

"enclave" exceptions from the exemption doctrine).
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should be protected from civil laws, including the tax laws. As discussed
above, for many faiths the most important channel for communicating religious
34 1
truths to congregations is through teaching during regular worship services.
At a minimum, therefore, sermons and similar oral communications during
regular worship services should be protected from the prohibition. Other
significant channels of internal religious communications, such as pastoral
letters, encyclicals, or other less formal means of communication should also
342
possibly be covered.
Even under this approach to institutional free exercise, there are at least two
arguments for it not protecting a house of worship from application of the
prohibition. First, the federal tax system is another form of government
enclave and so, like prisons, the military, public lands, and internal
343
administration, government action in this area deserves special deference.
Unlike these other areas, however, the tax system is neither limited to a subset
of the population with a special relationship to the government, nor is its effect
primarily internal to the government. To label anything relating to the tax
system as within a government enclave would open the door to making all
government regulations enclaves - for surely they are all important to the
functioning of the government - and thus eviscerate the concept of institutional
free exercise even in its currently accepted form (by at least federal appellate
courts).
The stronger counter-argument is that the prohibition is inherently different
from the employment discrimination laws that are the subject of the existing
ministerial exception. Those laws are regulatory in that they apply to all
houses of worship; there is no way for a house of worship to escape the reach
of those laws absent the ministerial exception. The prohibition is, however,
based on a subsidy because it only applies to a house of worship that receives
the benefit of tax-deductible charitable contributions. A house of worship that
surrenders that benefit or subsidy is no longer subject to the prohibition. 344 So
why should a house of worship that accepts this benefit be able to avoid the
prohibition that accompanies it?

341 See supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
342 See Bruce N. Bagni, Discriminationin the Name of the Lord: A CriticalEvaluation of

Discriminationby Religious Organizations,79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1539 (1979) (arguing
that certain activities at the "spiritual epicenter" of a church, including religious education,
should be protected from government regulation absent a compelling interest); Berg, supra
note 308, at 208 (suggesting that an institutional autonomy approach should cover "a
sermon, congregational newsletter, or other communication that would have happened
anyway"); Brady, supra note 297, at 1698 (concluding that because of the difficulties courts
face when trying to determine what regulations burden religious doctrine or practice, all
church affairs should be protected by the church autonomy doctrine).
141 See Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 99, at 934 n.6 (drawing a parallel between
the prison, military, and tax settings).

34 See articles cited supra note 241.
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The compelling response to this argument recognizes that the ability to
receive charitable contribution deductions, while it can and has been
characterized as a subsidy, is not like a government grant or other benefit that a
house of worship applies for knowing that by doing so it may be surrendering
some of its autonomy from the government. All houses of worship
automatically receive this benefit since its creation in the second decade of the
twentieth century. 345 Congress only added the prohibition decades later. 346 A
house of worship that is religiously compelled to violate the prohibition in its
internal communications would therefore, absent a constitutional or statutory
exemption, be required to give up what has not only been a long-established
benefit, but one that it never affirmatively chose to claim but instead received
by default. This house of worship is therefore at an automatic disadvantage
with respect to every other house of worship that does not share that particular
religious conviction.
In practice, this prohibition is thus more like a regulatory provision than a
subsidy, but the penalty for violating the prohibition is the fine imposed by
losing the ability to receive tax-deductible contributions - a penalty that other
houses of worship do not face because they do not share this particular
religious conviction. The appropriate baseline here is not a house of worship
without the ability to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, because
all houses of worship automatically have this ability. Rather, the appropriate
baseline is a house of worship with the ability to receive tax-deductible
contributions, so the removal of this ability actually imposes a penalty on a
house of worship for its religiously motivated actions.
There is a risk that this argument proves too much, in that it could lead to
the conclusion that houses of worship should not be covered by any of the
limitations imposed on charities - such as the prohibition on private inurement
or private benefit that are violated by, for example, excessive compensation because any of those limitations represent as strong a violation of a house of
worship's institutional freedom as the political campaign intervention
prohibition. There is, however, an aspect of internal religious communications
that separates it from other activities, such as the setting of compensation.
That aspect is that such communications are necessary to impart religious
beliefs, which are the reason for the institution's existence. Without the ability
to protect such communications from government interference, the very
existence of those beliefs is at risk. It is therefore this combination of the fact
that the prohibition is effectively regulatory and not a subsidy because it is
automatically granted to houses of worship, and the fact that internal religious

34' See John A. Wallace & Robert W. Fisher, The CharitableDeduction Under Section
170 of the Internal Revenue Code, in IV RESEARCH PAPERS: TAXES 2131, 2131 (Comm'n on
Private Philanthropy and Pub. Needs, Dep't of Treasury 1977) (detailing the 1917 creation
of the charitable contribution deduction); supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining
why houses of worship are not required to apply for charitable status).
346 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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communications are essential to the maintenance and transmission of religious
beliefs, that brings such communications - but not necessarily other conditions
imposed by the federal tax laws on the ability to receive tax-deductible
contributions - within the scope of institutional free exercise.
Finally, the protection should not be absolute. Besides the government
enclave exception already discussed, a sufficiently compelling governmental
interest furthered in a narrowly tailored manner could possibly be sufficient to
overcome the institutional free exercise protection. For the reasons already
detailed, however, the prohibition's application in this context is unlikely to
meet this high standard as long as the protected political messages are only a
relatively small part of a house of worship's activities. 347
B.

RFRA Revisited

This institutional perspective is relevant to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act as well. RFRA, on its face, does not mention the church
autonomy doctrine or any other version of institutional free exercise. It is
clear, however, that Congress intended that both religious institutions and
individuals could invoke RFRA's protection. The earliest versions of the
legislation explicitly defined "person" as including not only individuals, but
also "religious organizations, associations, and corporations. 348
No
explanation is provided in the legislative history for why later versions of the
legislation, including the version ultimately passed by Congress, do not include
a definition for person, but in the absence of a definition in the specific statute
at issue, the General Provisions of the United States Code provide "[i]n
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates
otherwise... the word[] 'person' ... include[s] corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well
as individuals. '349 There is nothing in the context of RFRA to indicate that
that definition does not apply, and in fact, there are numerous examples
provided in its legislative history that indicate its drafters and supporters
intended to protect institutions as well as individuals. 350 Given the differences
already discussed between these religious institutions and individuals, the
question therefore is whether those differences should make a difference when
applying RFRA to a religious institution. The answer to this question is that
such differences may, and in the political sermon context should, matter for
purposes of determining whether the affected house of worship is substantially
burdened in its exercise of religion. This effect on the substantial burden
analysis in turn influences the scope of any RFRA-required exception.

...See supra Part III.C.2.
S. 3254, 101st Cong. § 4(4) (1990); see also H.R. 4040, 102d Cong. § 5(4) (1991);
H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. § 4(4) (1990).
149 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
350 See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 232, at 234-36.
141
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As the language of RFRA makes clear, the key issue under the substantial
burden requirement is whether the person at issue - individual or institution bears such a burden because of the government's rule or action. 351 As
previously discussed, whether a burden is substantial appears to turn on the
extent of the government's interference with the exercise of religion and the
extent to which the government action occurs within a government enclave,
such as on public land or within government agencies. 352 An institutional
perspective strengthens the argument that the political campaign intervention
prohibition as applied to sermons imposes a substantial burden under RFRA
for several reasons.
First, the prohibition inhibits a primary and important means of
communication within the institution for religious messages. 35 3 That alone
suggests the burden on a house of worship is substantial. Furthermore, internal
house of worship communications are about as far from being a government
enclave as could be imagined. They are in fact within a house of worship
enclave, if the reasoning of the Roy and Lyng cases is applied to houses of
worship as well as to the government. Moreover, requiring a house of worship
to create a separate, although related institution to pay for and communicate
the prohibited message and any activities deemed related to that message is a
fundamental violation of that house of worship's integrity as an institution.
The decision of whether to form a separate legal entity, no matter how closely
it can be related to the house of worship parent, should not be one forced on a
house of worship if it wishes to engage in internal speech on religious matters
with its congregants. When combined with the difficulty, if not impossibility,
of applying the "alternative channel" rationale to the unique context of
sermons already described, recognition of institutional free exercise provides
strong, additional support for concluding that the prohibition as applied to
sermons meets RFRA's substantial burden requirement.
The institutional perspective is also relevant for determining the extent of
the RFRA-required exception to the prohibition. Absent that perspective, the
exception should be limited to otherwise prohibited messages communicated
as part of the sermon, homily, or other teaching that is part of a regular worship
service and then only for those houses of worship that can demonstrate that
both their political communication and the form of that communication were
religiously motivated. For the reasons already discussed, it is highly likely

...See

42

U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (2006) ("Government shall not substantially burden a

person's exercise of religion .... (emphasis added)); id. § 2000bb- 1(b) ("Government may
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person .... (emphasis added)).
352 See supra Part HI.B.2.
311 See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the critical role of teaching
and preaching within houses of worship).
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there are numerous houses of worship that could meet these requirements. 354
The IRS and the courts would be required to make individualized (or, perhaps
in some cases, denominational-wide) determinations regarding whether these
requirements are met, but this is not an overwhelming burden compared with
applying the prohibition generally, especially since it does not raise more
significant entanglement concerns than applying the prohibition generally, as
general application already requires individualized determinations.
The institutional perspective, however, would arguably justify excluding all
internal house of worship communications, or at least those that are religious in
nature. 355 This is because the burden would be substantial not only due to the
difficulty of separating out the costs of candidate-related communication,
which only applies to sermons and similar in-service messages, but also due to
the interference with the transmission of religious matters within the house of
worship institution. It also would not turn on the religious motivations of the
house of worship at issue, effectively assuming that sufficient religious
motivation supports any religious message communicated internally by a house
of worship, such that tampering with the contents of that message would
substantially burden the exercise of religion by the house of worship. This
perspective would therefore justify a broader exception.
V.

DEFINING THE EXCEPTION

Whether based on RFRA or the Constitution, any exception to the
prohibition must be defined sufficiently to permit both the IRS to administer it
and houses of worship to understand it. While this Article does not intend to
address all of the possible definitional and other issues raised by the creation of
such an exception, it will try to explain briefly why these issues do not appear
insurmountable.
Common definitional issues will include "house of worship" and "member,"
assuming that a "regular worship service" is defined as a regular meeting of the
Other
house of worship's members for worship, ritual, or teaching.
definitional issues will include "regular worship service" for the narrow
exception and "internal" for the broader exception. Boundary issues will
include when a worship meeting is no longer "regular" because of the presence
of a large number of non-members 356 and how far a house of worship can

314 See supra notes 161, 190 and accompanying text (discussing the potential religious
importance of political sermons).
311 For an argument that all internal communications, whether explicitly religious or not,
should be covered, see Laycock & Thomas, supra note 232, at 234.
356 For example, is a regularly scheduled Saturday night service where many nonmembers are expected because of the presence of a nationally known outside speaker still a
"regular worship service"?
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distribute a communication before it is no longer "internal. '357 Finally, the
courts would need to determine the exact limits of the exception in contexts
such as prisons, the military, and other areas of particularly strong government
concern.
None of these definitional concerns appear insurmountable, as both the IRS
and the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") have to deal with many of these
issues already in similar contexts. As has already been noted, the IRS
currently must apply a definition of "church" (equivalent to the term "house of
worship" used in this Article) for numerous federal tax purposes. 358 Similarly,
both the IRS and the FEC have to make determinations regarding who
qualifies as a "member" for various purposes under the federal tax and election
laws, respectively, and the FEC has to determine whether corporations and
unions have limited messages about their candidate endorsements to "internal"
359
channels.
One possible objection is that unlike in these other contexts, the question of
who is a "member" may have religious significance, which could lead a house
of worship to assert a broader definition than either the IRS or the FEC
currently uses. At the extreme, a church with an extensive broadcast ministry
might claim that it believes everyone who hears the pastor's message - that is,
every television viewer and radio listener - is a member and so
communications with them are "internal" to the church. Assuming that such
an assertion reflects a sincere religious belief does not, however, automatically
mean that such communications fall within either a RFRA or institutional free
exercise based exception to the prohibition. With respect to the RFRA-based
exception, the religious significance of the means of communications is almost
certainly lowered when the message is part of a broadcast as opposed to an inperson service and, regardless of whether it is, the burden of having the
broadcast attributed to and paid for by a non-charitable affiliate almost
certainly falls below the substantial threshold. With respect to a broader,
institutional free exercise based exception, there are still limits to such an
exception - probably at the point the government can demonstrate a
compelling interest and a narrowly tailored remedy, such as the need to prevent
corruption and the appearance of corruption created by church-paid, broadcast
messages supporting or opposing candidates - that would prevent its expansion
to this degree even in the face of an assertion that everyone within the
(electronically enhanced) sound of the pastor' s voice is a member.

357For example, making CDs of the sermon available in the house of worship lobby for

anyone who missed it, compared with broadcasting the sermon live in the local media
market, or posting the sermon on the internet.
358 See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
359 See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-3(a)(2) (2008) (requiring the IRS to distinguish
between communications to members and nonmembers for purposes of determining whether
expenditures by charities are for grassroots lobbying); supra note 269 and accompanying
text (relating to the FEC).
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As for boundary issues, most of those can be easily resolved, and so the hard
cases should be relatively few. For example, it generally should be easy to
distinguish between worship services that occur at the same day, time, and
location each week and follow essentially the same format from one-time
events in larger venues (to accommodate significant numbers of nonmembers), at different times and days, or from special events with one-time
advertising to the general community. Similarly, reproductions or broadcasts
that only primarily reach members - such as CDs sold in the house of
worship's lobby, webcasts available in a members-only portion of the house of
worship's website, or services piped into an overflow room - are readily
distinguishable from internet, cable, radio, or television broadcasts of sermons
that are readily available to and primarily reach the general public. Therefore
regardless of the exact scope of the exception, that exception should be
manageable by both the IRS and houses of worship.
CONCLUSION

In the course of addressing the almost inevitable challenge to the application
of the political campaign intervention prohibition to a sermon delivered during
a house of worship's regular service, the courts will face a number of questions
that have so far been left unanswered in the post-Smith, RFRA world. The
ramifications of these answers may extend well beyond this important but
limited context. With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the extent and effect
of the various exceptions to the rule articulated in Employment Division v.
Smith will be at issue, although this Article ultimately concludes that even if
one or more of the exceptions is available, such a challenge will fail under the
existing application of the Free Exercise Clause. Under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, the degree to which it actually imposed a higher standard than
existed pre-Smith will be tested. That higher standard alone should be enough
to render such a challenge successful in the unique context of an in-person
sermon for a house of worship that is religiously motivated to both
communicate a candidate-related message and to include that message in a
sermon. The protection by RFRA is, however, limited to this specific factual
situation, and so it will not be available for all houses of worship, including
ones that do not place any religious significance on the sermon or other inperson, in-service communication.
Consideration should, however, also be given to whether the institutional
setting of such a sermon requires a greater level of protection under the Free
Exercise Clause than would otherwise apply. This Article argues that the
institutional setting should matter. There is growing recognition that
constitutional rights held by individuals are not fully protected unless there is
also recognition that certain institutions play an important role in facilitating
the exercise of those rights. The courts have in fact already recognized this
fact to some extent for religious institutions, although both the scope of that
recognition and even its specific constitutional basis remains unsettled. If,
however, the role of institutions is relevant to the Free Exercise Clause at all,
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that provision should generally protect sermons and other internal religious
communications by houses of worship from government regulation, including
the prohibition, lest the very transmission of religious beliefs within a faith
body be inhibited.
This institutional perspective is also relevant to the application of RFRA. In
enacting RFRA, Congress explicitly recognized that institutions as well as
individuals engage in the exercise of religion. Courts should therefore
consider the institutional context of federal laws that burden that exercise when
determining whether that burden is in fact substantial. With that perspective in
mind, it is clear that prohibiting certain content for internal religious
communications by houses of worship represents a substantial burden, unless a
house of worship is either willing to forgo significant tax benefits that accrue
to all of its activities, or is willing to subdivide its activities (including
activities related to the prohibited communication but not consisting of the
prohibited communication itself) between itself and another entity. Applying
the compelling government interest/least restrictive means standard to such a
prohibition as it applies to the house of worship at issue, as RFRA requires,
places a burden on the government that it is unlikely to be able to meet. If the
government fails to meet this standard, the institutional perspective strongly
suggests that not only sermons but all internal, religious communications
would be substantially burdened, and so would have to be exempt from the
prohibition. The recognition of institutional free exercise protection in this
context would also ensure greater protection under both RFRA and the First
Amendment for the internal religious communications of houses of worship.
Ultimately, the recognition of protection for institutional free exercise would
significantly enhance the rights guaranteed by both the Free Exercise Clause
and RFRA, and so ensure the continued protection of religious beliefs of all
stripes.

